

Econ 634 - Political Economy (PhD level)

Instructors: Augustin Bergeron & Jeff Weaver

Course Description:

This course is an upper year field course for economics PhD students. Students are expected to have taken PhD-level econometrics and microeconomics. This course is intended to: 1) familiarize students with the literature in political economy; 2) learn to critically engage the academic literature; 3) equip students with skills that they will need as academic researchers, such as presenting and writing referee reports; and 4) assist students in starting their own research.

The course will meet once per week on Mondays from 8:30-11:50am. The format of class will be the following, with some adjustment as the course progresses. Jeff will teach the first half of the course, and Augustin the second half.

Office hours:

Jeff - Drop-In Office Hours: Tuesdays 1:15pm-1:55pm
- Appointment Office Hours ([sign-up link](#)): Wednesdays 3:30-4:30pm
Augustin - Appointment Office Hours ([sign-up link](#)): Thursdays 3:30-5pm

Course timing:

8:30-9:30am:

- The class will begin with one presentation on the starred papers by a student (One of the professors will do this for the first week). The presentation should last for approximately 35-40 minutes, including interjections and questions by the class, followed by 10 minutes of discussion led by the presenter focused on critiques and extensions.

9:30-11:30am:

- Following that, we will discuss the remaining papers in turn. We will ask one student to begin the discussion with a pithy 2-4 minute summary of the content of the paper. We will then go through the paper, with us asking questions to guide the conversation. We will spend between 30 and 45 minutes on each of the other papers, depending on their number.
- At around 10:30am, we will take a short break and have some snacks provided by the professors.

11:30-11:50am

- We will give a short preview of the results for the next week and the empirical strategy that the papers are using. The goal is that this should make you prepared to engage more critically and deeply with the paper
- It will also give a brief introduction to the material for the upcoming week and the types of questions that you should keep in mind when reading those papers/thinking of critiques and extensions.

Textbook:

There is no assigned textbook for this class. Material will be based on (occasional) lecture notes and the economics articles listed for each class. However, the following resources may be useful for additional reading.

Olken, Ben and Rohini Pande (2013). [JPAL Governance Initiative Review Paper](#)

Finan, Fred, Olken, Ben and Rohini Pande (2015). The Personnel Economics of the State. NBER Working Paper

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Besley, Tim and Torsten Persson (2011) Pillars of Prosperity, Princeton University Press.

Downs, Anthony (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Boston, MA: Addison Wesley.

Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001) Special Interest Politics, MIT Press.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. MIT Press.

Daron Acemoglu's (very detailed) [lecture notes](#)

Grading:

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Requirements</u>	<u>% of Final Grade</u>
Presentations	<p>Each week, one paper will be presented by either us or a student. These presentations will rotate such that everyone presents the same number of times. Papers will be assigned to students during the first week of class, and each student will present once.</p> <p>The presentations should discuss: (i) the research question, motivation, contribution and relationship to the background literature; (ii) the data; (iii) the empirical strategy; (iv) the main results; (v) conclusions and generalizability; (vi) strengths and weaknesses of the paper; and (vii) future directions for research on the topic. Please send your slides to the professor running that week prior to class so that they can make comments on the slides themselves.</p> <p>The presentations will be followed by questions from the rest of the class and discussion. The presentations will be graded by us.</p>	25%
Replication exercise	<p>For this exercise, you will work with data from a real paper in order to replicate the main set of results as well as extend them. The replication exercise is due on November 7 by 8:30 am (i.e., before class). Further details on this assignment can be found below.</p>	20%
Referee Report	<p>During the semester, students will select one paper from a list of recent job market papers in political economy and write a referee report on those papers. These reports should follow the format of a referee report and be as if you were actually refereeing the paper. The referee report is due on November 28 by 8:30 am (i.e., before class). Further details on this assignment can be found below.</p>	10%
Presentation of research proposal	<p>During the final week of the course/exam period, you will present a proposal for your own original research project. The goal of this</p>	25%

	<p>assignment is to give you a start on thinking about your dissertation and coming up with a research proposal.</p> <p>In your presentation, you should: 1) describe the research question and why it is of interest (5 minutes); 2) summarize the related literature (5 minutes); 3) give a description of your proposed project (20 minutes). The proposal should either have 1) a solid identification strategy and description of your data or planned data collection process; or 2) some data with at least one table or figure. We will provide more details on this as the semester goes on.</p> <p>You must meet with us about your proposed project at least once before spending much time on it. You should plan to meet with at least one of us for 15-20 minutes during office hours so that we can talk in more detail. We would recommend that you start thinking about the project early, and start a list of ideas for possible projects while going through the semester. The best case is that you have a list of possible projects when we meet, and then we can work together to decide which is the strongest.</p> <p>To further help you with your research proposal, we would like you to fill in a short sheet indicating: (1) your research question, (2) what variation you will examine, (3) the proposed estimating equation, (4) the data source(s). The goal of this assignment is to help you refine your research proposal. It's not binding: you can change your mind later and you can submit more than one sheet. The deadline to submit it is October 31 (in class).</p> <p>Presentations will be evaluated on both content and presentation style. Immediately before your presentation, you should send us a copy of your slides so that we can make notes on them. You will not need to turn in anything else written for this assignment (i.e. no written project proposal) – the presentation is the final product. We will give detailed feedback on the presentation and the research idea based on that.</p>	
Class participation	<p>You should actively participate in class discussions. At a minimum, you should talk at least twice per class (and hopefully more than that). This can be a comment, a question, a request for clarification on a particular part of a paper or empirical technique, or an idea that you had for how to extend the paper (or a related research idea).</p> <p>This can be challenging for some students, but it is an absolutely essential skill as a researcher; talking during class is a good way to get practice in what should hopefully be a low stress setting. We would suggest that when you are reading the articles, you write down some bullet points on things that you might want to say about what the authors did rather than just highlighting and trying to understand what they have done.</p>	20%

Auditing the Course

Advanced year PhD students and others are welcome to audit the course. Our expectation is that auditors will have read the papers prior to class and be ready to discuss them. Depending on the number of enrolled students, they may also be expected to do one presentation, but do not have to submit any of the other course assignments.

Course Outline:

In the syllabus, required papers are starred with an asterix (*). The paper to be presented that week is marked with double asterisks (**). Students are expected to have read all starred papers prior to the start of each class. Those papers can be found in [this dropbox folder](#) for download.

If you have time, you may find it useful to read Persson and Tabellini (2000) chapters 1-5 to get some background on the theoretical side of political economy. This class will be focused on empirical research, so I will not cover this material. But knowing about the theoretical side helps to motivate empirical research.

Week 1 (August 22): Introduction to Political Economy/ Voter Turnout [Jeff]

Jeff will begin with an overview of the course and present on the (**) Gerber and Green (2000) paper to demonstrate what your presentations should look like. We will then discuss the remaining starred papers. **Note: You are expected to have read the starred papers even though this is the first week!**

**Gerber, Alan and Donald Green (2000). "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review*, 94, 3, 653-663.

Coate, Stephen, Michael Conlin, and Andrea Moro (2008). "The performance of pivotal-voter models in small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas liquor referenda", *Journal of Public Economics*, 92, 582-596.

Coate, Stephen and Michael Conlin (2004). "A Group Rule-Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence." *American Economic Review*, 94, 5, 1476-1504.

DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., Malmendier, U., & Rao, G. (2016). Voting to tell others. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 84(1), 143-181.

Fujiwara, T., Meng, K., & Vogl, T. (2016). Habit formation in voting: Evidence from rainy elections. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 8(4), 160-88.

*Gerber, Alan, Donald Green, and Christopher Larimer (2008). "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment", *American Political Science Review*, 102(1), 33-48.

*Washington, Ebonya (2006). "How Black Candidates Affect Voter Turnout", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(3), 973-998.

Week 2 (August 29): Political Preferences [Jeff]

****Alesina, Alberto and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). "Good Bye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences." American Economic Review, 97, 4, 1507-1528.**

Bursztyn, Leonardo and Davide Cantoni (2016). "A Tear in the Iron Curtain: The Impact of Western Television on Consumption Behavior." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 98(1): 25-41.

*Cantoni, Davide, Yuyu Chen, David Y. Yang, Noam Yuchtman, Y. Jane Zhang (2017). "Curriculum and Ideology." *Journal of Political Economy*, 125(2): 338-392.

Edlund, Lena and Rohini Pande (2002). "Why Have Women Become Left-Wing? The Political Gender Gap and the Decline in Marriage," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 917-961.

Fujiwara, Thomas (2011). "A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger's Law", *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 6, pp. 197-233.

Jensen, Robert and Emily Oster (2009). "The Power of TV: Cable Television and Women's Status in India." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(3): 1057-1094.

Kuziemko, I., R. Buell, T. Reich, and M. Norton (2014). "Last-place Aversion: Evidence and Redistributive Implications," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129 (1): 105-149.

E Luttmer (2001). "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution." *Journal of Political Economy*, 109, 3, 500-528.

Manacorda, Marco, Edward Miguel, and Andrea Vigorito. (2011). "Government Transfers and Political Support", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(3), 1-28.

* Mullainathan, Sendhil and Ebonya Washington (2009). "Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Political Attitudes", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(1), 86-111.

* Pons, Vincent, & Tricaud, Clémence (2018). Expressive voting and its cost: Evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates. *Econometrica*, 86(5), 1621-1649.

Week 3 (September 12): Political representative identity and agency [Jeff]

*Chattopadhyay, Raghendra and Esther Duflo (2004). "Women as Policymakers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica*, 72, 5, 1409-1443.

Beaman, L., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Pande, R., & Topalova, P. (2009). Powerful women: does exposure reduce bias?. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(4), 1497-1540.

Besley, Timothy and Anne Case (1995). "Does Political Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence From Gubernatorial Term Limits," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3), 769-98.

Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane, and Antonio Merlo (2005). "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers." *American Economic Review*, 95:347-373.

Dal Bó, Ernesto and Martín Rossi (2011). "Term Length and the Effort of Politicians," *Review of Economic Studies*, 78(4), 1237-1263.

*Ferreira, Fernando and Joseph Gyourko (2009). "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from Cities." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124, 1.

Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2010). "Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audit of local governments," *American Economic Review*, 101, 1274-1311.

Fujiwara, Thomas, "Voting technology, political responsiveness, and infant health: Evidence from Brazil," *Econometrica*, 2015, 83 (2), 423-464.

**Lee, David, Enrico Moretti and Matthew Butler (2004). "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the US House." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August, 807-859.

McGuirk, Eoin, Nathaniel Hilger, and Nicholas Miller. No kin in the game: Moral hazard and war in the US Congress. No. w23904. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021.

Petterson-Lidbom, Per (2008). "Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach", *Journal of the European Economic Association*. 6 (5), pp. 1037-1056.

* Washington, E. L. (2008). "Female socialization: How daughters affect their legislator fathers". *American Economic Review*, 98(1):311-32.

Week 4 (September 19): Media [Jeff]

*Chen, Yuyu and Yang, David (2019). "The Impact of Media Censorship: 1984 or Brave New World?". *American Economic Review*, 109(6)

DellaVigna, Stefano and Ethan Kaplan (2007). "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122(3): 1187-1234.

Durante, Ruben and Brian Knight (2012). "Partisan Control, Media Bias, and Viewer Responses: Evidence from Berlusconi's Italy." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 10(3): 451-481.

Durante, Ruben and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2018). "Attack When the World Is Not Watching? US News and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *Journal of Political Economy* 126(3): 1085-1133.

*Levy, Ro'ee. (2021). "Social Media, News Consumption, and Polarization: Evidence from a Field Experiment" . *American Economic Review*, 111(3)

*Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J. M., & Sinkinson, M. (2011). The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics. *American Economic Review*, 101(7), 2980-3018.

Martin, Gregory J. and Ali Yurukoglu (2017). "Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization." *American Economic Review* 107(9): 2565-2599.

Paluck, Elizabeth and Don Green (2009). "Deference, Dissent and Dispute Resolution: An Experimental Intervention Using Mass Media to Change Norms and Behavior in Rwanda." *American Political Science Review*, 103, 4, 622-644.

**Snyder, James and David Stromberg (2010). "Press Coverage and Political Accountability." *Journal of Political Economy* 118(2).

Week 5 (September 26): Money in politics [Jeff]

-I recommend skimming the first 8 pages of Ansolabehere, Stephen, John (2002). "Why is there So Little Money in Politics?" in the *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, though we will not discuss it in class

*Avis, Eric, Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan, and Carlos Varjao. "Money and politics: The effects of campaign spending limits on political entry and competition." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* (2018).

Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi (2014). "Is it Whom You Know or What you Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process." *American Economic Review*, 104, 12, 3885-3920.

**Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, and Francesco Trebbi. "Tax-exempt lobbying: Corporate philanthropy as a tool for political influence." *American Economic Review* 110, no. 7 (2020): 2065-2102.

Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman, Brad Hackinen, and Francesco Trebbi. "Hall of mirrors: Corporate philanthropy and strategic advocacy." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 136, no. 4 (2021): 2413-2465.

Blanes-Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca and Christian Fons-Roen (2012). "Revolving Door Lobbyists." *American Economic Review*, 102, 7, 3731-3748.

*Finan, Frederico and Laura Schecter (2012) "Vote-Buying and Reciprocity", *Econometrica*, 80(2): 863-881

Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. 'Protection for Sale.' *American Economic Review*. 84(4): 833-850.

Levitt, Steven (1994). "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House", *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(4), 777-798.

*Spenkuch, Jorg and David Toniatti (2018). "Political Advertising and Election Results". Quarterly Journal of Economics (133)4, 1981-2036

Vicente, Pedro (2013), "Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa?" Economic Journal.

Week 6 (October 3): Corruption [Augustin]

Avis, Eric, Claudio Ferraz, and Frederico Finan. (2018) "Do government audits reduce corruption? Estimating the impacts of exposing corrupt politicians." Journal of Political Economy, 126(5): 1912-1964.

Bandiera, Oriana, Andrea Prat, and Tommaso Valletti (2009) "Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment", American Economic Review, 99(4): 1278-1308.

Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Clement Imbert, Santhosh Mathew, Rohini Pande (2020) "E-governance, Accountability and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India", American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12(4): 39-72.

Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna, Jordan Kyle, Benjamin Olken, Sudarno Sumarto (2018) "Tangible Information and Citizen Empowerment: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia", Journal of Political Economy, 126(2): 451-491.

Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna and Sendhil Mullainathan (2012). "Corruption." Chapter 27 in Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Princeton University Press.

Bertrand, Marianne, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna, Sendhil Mullainathan (2007) "Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4): 1639-1676.

Burgess, Robin, Matthew Hansen, Benjamin Olken, Peter Potapov, and Stefanie Sieber (2012) "The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4): 1707-1754.

Bobonis Gustavo , Luis Camara Fuertes, and Rainer Schwabe (2016) "Monitoring Corruptible Politicians", American Economic Review, 106(8): 2371-2405.

Camacho, Adriana and Emily Conover (2011) "Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility", American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3(2): 41-65.

Di Tella, Rafael and Ignacio Franceschelli (2011) "Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals", American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(4): 119-151.

**Ferraz, Claudio, and Fred Finan. (2008). "Exposing Corrupt politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2), 703-745.

Muralidharan, K., Niehaus, P., & Sukhtankar, S. (2016). Building state capacity: Evidence from biometric smartcards in India. *American Economic Review*, 106(10): 2895-2929.

Naritomi, Joana (2019) "Consumers as Tax Auditors", *American Economic Review*, 109(9): 3031-3072.

Niehaus, Paul and Sukhtankar, Sandip (2013) "Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect", *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 5(4): 230-269.

*Olken, Benjamin (2007). "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," *Journal of Political Economy*, 115, 2, 200-249.

*Olken, Benjamin and Barron, Patrick (2009), "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh", *Journal of Political Economy* 117(3), 417-452.

*Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul, Kristof Titeca, Haoyang Xie, Albert Malukisa Nkuku, Aimable A. Lameke (2022) "The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency", Working Paper.

Sequeira, Sandra (2016) "Corruption, Trade Costs, and Gains from Tariff Liberalization: Evidence from Southern Africa", *American Economic Review*, 106(10): 3029-3063.

Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny (1993) "Corruption", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(3): 599-617.

Svensson, Jakob (2003) "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118(1):207-230.

Week 7 (October 10): Institutions and Long-run Persistence [Jeff]

**Acemoglu, D, S. Johnson and J Robinson (2001). "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. " *The American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369-1401.

*Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution". *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 117(4), 1231-1294.

*Alsan, Marcella (2015). The Effect of the TseTse Fly on African Development. *American Economic Review*, 105, 382-410 (2015).

Banerjee, Abhijit and Iyer, Lakshmi (2005) "History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." *American Economic Review*, 95, 1190-1213.

Bleakley, Hoyt and Lin, Jeffrey "Portage and Path Dependence". *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May 2012, volume 127, pp. 587-644.

*Dell, Melissa (2010). The persistent effects of Peru's mining mita. *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903

Melissa Dell and Ben Olken, The Development Effects of the Extractive Colonial Economy: The Dutch Cultivation System in Java. *Review of Economic Studies*. 87, 164–203 (2019).

Dell, Melissa, Lane, Nathan and Querubin, Pablo, The Historical State, Local Collective Action, and Economic Development in Vietnam. *Econometrica* 86, 2083–2121 (2018).

Engerman, S. L., & Sokoloff, K. L. (2002). "Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development among new world economics" (No. w9259). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Nunn, N. (2008). The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 139-176.

Week 8 (October 17): Regime Change and Democratization [Jeff]

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Pierre Yared. (2008). "Income and Democracy", *American Economic Review*, 98(3), 808-842.

Acemoglu, D. (2006). *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Cambridge University Press (pgs. 99-203)

Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James, and Ragnar Torvik. 2013. "Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?" *The Review of Economic Studies*. 80(3): 845-875.

* Aidt, Toke, and Raphaël Franck, 2015. "Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832." *Econometrica*. 83(2): 505-547.

Angelucci, Charles, Simone Meraglia, and Nico Voigtlander (2022) "How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments: From the Norm Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act", *American Economic Review*, 112(10): 3441-87.

* Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria and Gerard Pedro i Miguel (2013). "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya." *American Economic Review*, 105, 6, 1817-51.

Dal Bó, Pedro, Andrew Foster and Louis Putterman (2010). "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy." *American Economic Review*, 100, 2205-2229.

* Francois, Patrick, Rainer, Ilia, and Francesco, Trebbi. 2015. "How is Power Shared in Africa?" *Econometrica*. 83(2): 465-503.

Jha, Saumitra. 2015. "Financial Asset Holdings and Political Attitudes: Evidence from Revolutionary England." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 1485-1545.

** Martinez-Bravo, M., i Miquel, G. P., Qian, N., & Yao, Y. (2021). "The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-off". forthcoming *American Economic Review*

Olken, B. A. (2010). Direct democracy and local public goods: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. *American Political Science Review*, 104(02), 243-267.

Pande, R. (2011). Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies. *Annual Review of Economics*, 3(1), 215-237.

Przeworski, Adam. 2014. "Acquiring the Habit of Changing Governments Through Elections." *Comparative Political Studies*. 48(1): 101-129.

Svolik, Milan. 2013. "Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy." *American Journal of Political Science*. 57(3): 685-702.

Week 9 (October 24): State Capacity and Nation-Building [Augustin]

Acemoglu, Daron, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno, and James Robinson (2015) "State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach", *American Economic Review*, 105(8): 2364-2409.

Allen, Robert, Mattia Bertazzini, and Leander Heldring (2020), "The Economic Origins of Government", Working Paper.

Bazzi, Samuel, Arya Gaduh, Alex Rothenberg, and Maisy Wong (2019) "Unity in Diversity? How Intergroup Contact Can Foster Nation Building", *American Economic Review*, 109(11): 3978-4025.

Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson (2009) "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics", *American Economic Review*, 99(4): 1218-1244.

Blanc, Guillaume and Masahiro Kubo (2021) "French", Working Paper.

*Blouin, Arthur, and Sharun Mukand (2019) "Erasing Ethnicity? Propaganda, Nation Building, and Identity in Rwanda", *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(3): 1008-1062.

Cantoni, Davide, Cathrin Mohr, and Matthias Weigand (2022) "The Rise of Fiscal Capacity", Working Paper.

*Chambry, Cédric, Emeric Henry, and Benjamin Marx (2022) "The Dynamic Consequences of State-Building: Evidence from the French Revolution", Working Paper.

Dal Bo, Ernesto, Pablo Hernandez-Lagos, and Sebastian Mazzuca (2022) "The Paradox of Civilization: Preindustrial Sources of Security and Prosperity", *American Political Science Review*, 116(1): 213-30.

Dell, Melissa, Nathan Lane, and Pablo Querubin (2018) "The Historical State, Local Collective Action, and Economic Development in Vietnam", *Econometrica*, 86(6): 2083-2121.

Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio, Ruben Durante, and Filipe Campante (2020) "Building Nations Through Shared Experiences: Evidence from African Football", *American Economic Review*, 110(5): 1572-1602.

Dincecco, Mark and Gabriel Kayz (2016) "State Capacity and Long-Run Economic Performance", *Economic Journal*, 126(590): 189-218.

Ferguson, Leopoldo, Horacio Larreguy, and Juan Felipe Riano (2022) "Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico", *The Economic Journal*, forthcoming.

Garfias, Francisco (2018) "Elite Competition and State Capacity Development: Theory and Evidence from Post-Revolution Mexico", *American Political Science Review*, 112(2): 339-357.

Gennaioli, Nicola and Hans-Joachim Voth (2015) "State Capacity and Military Conflict", *The Review of Economic Studies*, 82(4): 1409-1448.

Johnson, Noel D. (2019) "Taxes, National Identity, and Nation Building: Evidence from France", Working Paper.

Karaman, Kivanc and Sevkett Pamuk (2013) "Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction Between Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime", *American Political Science Review*, 107(3): 603-626.

*Mayshar, Joram, Omer Moav, and Luigi Pascali (2022) "The Origin of the State: Land Productivity or Appropriability?", *Journal of Political Economy*, 130(4): 1091-1144.

Miguel, Edward (2004) "Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya Versus Tanzania", *World Politics*, 56(3): 327-362.

**Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul (2020) "On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo", *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(1): 32-74.

Schonholzer, David (2020) "The Origin of the Incentive Compatible State: Environmental Circumscription", Working paper.

Sellers, Emily and Francisco Garfias (2022) "Fiscal Legibility and State Development: Evidence from Colonial Mexico", Working Paper.

Week 10 (October 31): Taxation [Augustin]

*Balan, Pablo, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan Weigel (2022) "Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", *American Economic Review*, 112(3): 762-797.

*Basri, Chatib, Mayara Felix, Rema Hanna, Benjamin Olken (2021) "Tax Administration versus Tax Rates: Evidence from Corporate Taxation in Indonesia", *American Economic Review*, 111(12): 3827-71.

Bergeron, Augustin, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan Weigel (2022) “The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence from Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC”, Working Paper.

Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson (2013) “Taxation and Development”, Handbook of Public Economics, 5: 51-110.

Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson (2014) “Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(4): 99-120.

Besley, Timothy (2020) “State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract”, Econometrica, 88(4): 1307-1335.

Best, Micheal, Anne Brockmeyer, Henrik Kleven, Johannes Spinnewijn, and Mazhar Waseem (2015) “Production versus Revenue Efficiency with Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan”, Journal of Political Economy, 123(6): 1311-1355.

Casaburi, Lorenzo and Igo Troiano (2016) “Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(1): 273-314.

Gadenne, Lucie (2017) “Tax Me, but Spend Wisely? Sources of Public Finance and Government Accountability”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9(1): 274-314.

Jensen, Anders (2022) “Employment Structure and the Rise of the Modern Tax System”, American Economic Review, 112(1): 213-34.

*Khan, Adnand, Asim Khwaja, and Benjamin Olken (2016) “Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(1): 219-271.

Martinez, Luis (2022) “Natural Resource Rents, Local Taxes and Government Performance: Evidence from Colombia”, Working Paper.

Naritomi, Joana (2019) “Consumers as Tax Auditors”, American Economic Review, 109(9): 3031-3037.

De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel, Clément Imbert, Johannes Spinnewijn, Teodora Tsankova, and Maarten Luts (2021) “How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-Wide Experiments in Belgium”, Journal of Political Economy, 129(5): 1425-1463.

**Pomeranz, Dina (2015) “No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax”, American Economic Review, 105(8): 2539-69.

Weigel, Jonathan (2020) “The Participation Divident of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage more with the State when it Tries to Tax them.”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(4): 1849-1903.

Week 11 (November 7): Leaders [Augustin]

Assouad, Lydia (2021) "Charismatic Leaders and Nation-Building", Working Paper.

Bassi, Vittorio, and Imran Rasul (2017) "Persuasion: A Case Study of Papal Influences on Fertility-Related Beliefs and Behavior", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9(4): 250-302.

Boudreau, Laura, Rocco Macchiavello, Virginia Minni, Mari Tanaka (2022) "Union Leaders: Experimental Evidence from Myanmar", Working Paper.

Besley, Timothy, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol (2011) "Do Educated Leaders Matter?" *The Economic Journal*, 121(554): 205-227.

Cagé, Julia, Anna Dagorret, Saumitra Jha, and Pauline Grosjean (2021), "Heroes and Villains: The Effects of Heroism on Autocratic Values and Nazi Collaboration in France", Working Paper.

Chattopadhyay, Raghavendra and Esther Duflo (2004) "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India", *Econometrica*, 72(5): 1409-1443.

*Dippel, Christian, and Stephan Heblich (2021) "Leadership in Social Movements: Evidence from the "Forty-Eighters" in the Civil War", *American Economic Review*, 111(2): 472-505.

Dube, Oeindrila and S. P. Harish (2020) "Queens", *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(7): 2579-2652.

Easterly, Williams, and Steven Pennings (2021) "Leader Value Added: Assessing the Growth Contribution of Individual National Leaders", Working Paper.

Ferguson, Thomas, and Hans-Joachim Voth (2008) "Betting on Hitler: The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1): 101-137.

Fisman, Raymond (2001) "Estimating the Value of Political Connections", *American Economic Review*, 91(4): 1095-1102.

Franck, Raphael and Ilia Rainer (2012) "Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa", *American Political Science Review*, 106(2): 294-325.

* Funke, Manuel, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch (2023) "Populist Leaders and the Economy", Working Paper.

* Hodler, Roland and Paul Raschky (2014) "Regional Favoritism", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(2): 995-1033.

** Jones, Benjamin and Benjamin Olken (2005) "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3): 835-864.

Jones, Benjamin and Benjamin Olken (2009) "Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War", *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 1(2): 55-87.

*Ottinger, Sebastian and Nico Voigtlander (2022) "History's Masters: The Effect of European Monarchs on State Performance", Working Paper.

Pande, Rohini (2003) "Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India", *American Economic Review*, 93(4): 1132-1151.

Wang, Tianyi (2021) "Media, Pulpit, and Populist Persuasion: Evidence from Father Coughlin", *American Economic Review*, 111(9): 3064-92.

Washington, Ebonya (2008) "Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect their Legislator Fathers' Voting on Women's Issues", *American Economic Review* (2008), 98(1): 311-332.

Week 12 (November 14): Bureaucracy and Bureaucrats [Augustin]

Aneja, Abhay, and Guo Xu (2022) "The Costs of Employment Segregation: Evidence from the Federal Government under Woodrow Wilson", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 137(2): 911-958.

*Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, Edward Davenport, and Scott Lee (2020) "Losing pro-sociality in the quest for talent? Sorting, selection, and productivity in the delivery of public services", *American Economic Review*, 110(5): 1355-94.

Bandiera, Oriana, Michael Best, Adnan Khan, and Andrea Prat (2021) "The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (forthcoming).

Bergeron, Augustin, Pedro Bessone, John Kabeya Kabeya, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan Weigel (2022) "Optimal Assignment of Bureaucrats: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Tax Collectors in the Democratic Republic of Congo", Working Paper.

Best, Michael, Jonas Hjort, and David Szaknyi (2019) "Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness", Working Paper.

Bertrand, Marianne, Robin Burgess, and Arunish Chawla (2020) "The Glittering Prizes: Career Incentives and Bureaucrat Performance", *Review of Economic Studies*, 87(2): 626-655.

Besley, Timothy, Robin Burgess, Adnan Khan, and Guo Xu (2021) "Bureaucracy and Development", *Annual Review of Economics*, 14: 397-424.

Colonnelli, Emanuele, Mounu Prem, and Edoardo Teso (2020) "Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations", *American Economic Review*, 110(10): 3071-99.

**Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, and Martin Rossi (2013) "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(3): 1169-1218.

Deserranno, Erika (2019) "Financial incentives as signals: experimental evidence from the recruitment of village promoters in Uganda", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 11(1): 277-317.

Deserranno, Erika, Philipp Kastrau, and Gianmarco Leon-Ciliotta (2022) "Promotions and Productivity: The Role of Meritocracy and Pay Progression in the Public Sector", Working Paper.

*Duflo, Esther, Rema Hanna, and Stephen Ryan (2012) "Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School", *American Economic Review*, 102(4): 1241-1278.

Fenzia, Alessandra (2022) "Managers and Productivity in the Public Sector", *Econometrica*, 90(3): 1063-1084.

Frederico Finan, Benjamin Olken, and Rohini Pande (2017) "The Personnel Economics of the State", *Handbook of Economic Field Experiments*, 2: 467-514.

Hanna, Rema and Shing-Yi Wang (2017). "Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 9(3): 262-290.

Khan, Adnan Q., Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken. "Making moves matter: Experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance-based postings." *American Economic Review* 109, no. 1 (2019): 237-70.

Moreira, Diana, and Santiago Pérez (2022) "Civil Service Reform and Organizational Practices: Evidence from the Pendleton Act", Working Paper.

Negggers, Yusuf (2018) "Enfranchising your Own? Experimental Evidence on Bureaucrat Diversity and Election Bias in India", *American Economic Review*, 108(6): 1288-1321.

Spenkuch, Jorg, Edoardo Teso, and Guo Xu (2021) "Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations", Working Paper.

*Xu, Guo (2018) "The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire", *American Economic Review*, 108(11): 3170-3198.

Week 13 (November 21): Culture and Institutions [Augustin]

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2021) "Culture, Institutions and Social Equilibria: A Framework", Working Paper.

Alesina, Alberto, and Paula Giuliano (2015) "Culture and Institutions", *Journal of Economic Literature*, 53(4): 898-944.

*Ashraf, Nava, Natalie Bau, Nathan Nunn, and Alessandra Voena (2020) "Bride Price and Female Education", *Journal of Political Economy*, 28(2): 591-641.

*Bau, Natalie (2021) "Can Policy Change Culture? Government Pension Plans and Traditional Kinship Practices", *American Economic Review*, 111(6): 1880-1917.

Bazzi, Samuel, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, and Benjamin Marx (2020) "The Institutional Foundations of Religious Politics: Evidence from Indonesia", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(2): 845-911.

Becker, Sascha, Katrin Boeckh, Christa Hainz, and Ludger Woessmann (2016) "The Empire is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy", *Economic Journal*, 126(590): 40-74.

Bisin, Alberto, and Thierry Verdier (2001) "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences", *Journal of Economic Theory*, 97(2): 298-319.

Bisin, Alberto, and Thierry Verdier (2021) "On the Joint Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Elites and Civil Society", Working Paper.

*Lowes, Sara, and Eduardo Montero (2021) "The Legacy of Colonial Medicine in Central Africa", *American Economic Review*, 111(4): 1284-1314.

Lowes, Sara, and Eduardo Montero (2021) "Concessions, Violence, and Indirect Rule: Evidence from the Congo Free State", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136(4): 2047-2091.

Moscona, Jacob and Awa Ambra Seck (2021) "Age Set vs. Kin: Culture and Financial Ties in East Africa", Working Paper.

Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon (2011) "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa", *American Economic Review*, 101(7): 3221-3251.

**Nunn, Nathan, James Robinson, Sara Lowes, Jonathan Weigel (2017) "The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom", *Econometrica*: 85(4): 1065-1091.

Ramos-Toro, Diego (2022) "Social Exclusion and Social Preferences: Evidence from Colombia's Leper Colony", Working Paper.

Tabellini, Guido (2008) "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3): 905-950.

Week 14 (November 28): Conflict [Augustin]

Abadie, Alberto and Javier Garbeazabal (2003) "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country", *American Economic Review*, 93(1): 113-132.

Acemoglu, Daron, Tarek A. Hassan, and James A. Robinson (2011) "Social Structure and Development: A Legacy of the Holocaust in Russia", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(2): 895-946.

Berman, Eli, Jacob Shapiro, and Joseph Felter (2011) "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," *Journal of Political Economy*, 119(4): 766-819.

Besley, Timothy and Marta Reynal-Querol (2014) "The Legacy of Historical Conflict: Evidence from Africa", *American Political Science Review*, 108(2): 319-336.

Blattman, Christopher (2009) "From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda", *American Political Science Review*, 103(2): 231-247.

Blattman, Christopher and Miguel, Edward (2010). "Civil War", *The Journal of Economic Literature*. 48(1): 3-57.

Blattman, Christopher and Jeannie Annan (2016). "Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State." *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 1-17.

Blattman, Christopher, Julian Jamison, and Margaret Sheridan (2017) "Reducing Crime and Violence: Experimental Evidence on Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in Liberia", *American Economic Review*, 107(4): 1165-1206.

Blattman, Christopher, Gustavo Duncan, Benjamin Lessing, and Santiago Tobon (2022) "Gang Rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance", Working Paper.

*Bulte, Erwin, Robert Lensink, Eleonora Nilsen, Daan Van Soest, Philip Verwimp, and Martin Voors (2012) "Violent Conflict and Behavior: Evidence from Field Experiments in Burundi", *American Economic Review*, 102(2): 941-964.

**Dell, Melissa (2015) "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War", *American Economic Review*, 105(6): 1738-1779.

Dell, Melissa and Pablo Querubin (2018). "Nation Building Through Foreign Intervention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 133(2): 701-764.

*Dube, Oeindrila and Juan Vargas (2013) "Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia" *The Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4): 1384-1421.

Guidolin, Massimo and Eliana La Ferrara (2007) "Diamonds are Forever, Wars are Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?", *American Economic Review*, 97(5): 1978-1993.

Heldring, Leander (2012) "The Origins of Violence in Rwanda", *The Review of Economic Studies*, 88(2): 730-763.

Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti (2004) "Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach", *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(4): 725-753.

Nunn, Nathan, and Nancy Qian (2014) "US Food Aid and Civil Conflict", American Economic Review, 104(6): 1630-1666.

Trebbi, Francesco and Eric Weese (2019) "Insurgency and Small Wars: Estimation of Unobserved Coalition Structures", 87(2): 463-496.

*Yanagizawa-Drott, David (2014) "Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4): 1947-1994.

Exam Time: Student Presentations on Research Projects 8:30am on **Monday, December 5th** and **Wednesday, December 7th.**

Replication exercise:

We ask you to conduct a replication of a paper related to the course from the following list:

- Bazzi Samuel, Arya Gaduh, Alex Rothenberg, and Maisy Wong (2019) "Unity in Diversity? How Intergroup Contact Can Foster Nation Building", American Economic Review, 109(11): 3978-4025
- Bobonis Gustavo, Luis Camara Fuertes, and Rainer Schwabe (2016) "Monitoring Corruptible Politicians", American Economic Review, 106(8): 2371-2405
- DellaVigna, Stefano and Ethan Kaplan (2007). "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting." Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3): 1187-1234.
- Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon (2011) "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa", American Economic Review, 101(7):3221-3251.

Please use the replication materials (data, code, codebook) in this [dropbox folder](#). If you'd prefer, you can also replicate one of the papers covered in class — starred with an asterisk (*) or double asterisks (**) on the syllabus — if a replication package (readme, data, and code) exists for the paper. If you would like to replicate another paper instead, it will have to be approved by the professors.

If you prefer to use R, then you could replicate the following papers:

- Alrababa'h,Ala'; Marble, William; Mousa,Salma; Siegel,Alexandra, 2021, "Replication Data for: Can Exposure to Celebrities Reduce Prejudice? The Effect of Mohamed Salah on Islamophobic Behaviors and Attitudes" (Replication files: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/2JKWNS>)
- Mousa, Salma. "Building social cohesion between Christians and Muslims through soccer in Post-ISIS Iraq." Science. Vol. 369, Issue 6505, pp. 866-870. (Replication files: <https://zenodo.org/record/3942437#.Y1xMg3bMKUK>)
- Gaikwad, Nikhar, and Gareth Nellis. "Do politicians discriminate against internal migrants? Evidence from nationwide field experiments in India." American Journal of Political Science 65.4 (2021): 790-806.
Replication files:
<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/Q4oRGE>
- Niehaus, Paul, and Sandip Sukhtankar. "Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5, no. 4 (November 2013): 23069

Replication files:

<https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/114842/version/V1/view?path=/pcms/projects/1/1/4/8/114842/V1.0.1/data-and-replication-files/README.pdf&type=file#>

You should replicate the analysis implementation on your own, and we ask that you extend the results in some way – this could be an examination of outside data, application of alternative methodologies to answer the original question differently or do work beyond that shown in the original paper and appendixes to explore alternative views on what drives the published results. Please submit your replication codes, tables, and figures, a narrative description of your replication findings in the form of an extended report, as well as a 1-2 page writeup of your extension.

The replication exercise is due on **November 7 by 8:30 am**, i.e., just before class. Please e-mail your codes, results, and writeups to augustin.bergeron@usc.edu and jbweaver@usc.edu.

Referee Report:

Writing referee reports is an important task on which graduate students frequently do not receive much training. This is an important way in which you can contribute to the profession and improve the research of others. It is also good practice in reading a paper carefully and deconstructing its argument.

Whenever doing a referee report, you should prepare two documents. The first is the referee report, which should be 2-3 pages double-spaced. The report has three main parts:

- One paragraph summary of the main argument of the article
- 2-4 major comments on the paper, where you discuss important positives or drawbacks of the paper. These should each be around a paragraph in length.
- Finally, you should conclude the report with minor comments. These can be 1-3 sentences, and refer to more minor points about the paper.

When writing the reports, always consider your audience – you are writing these to the author and editor. The editor will likely not have read the paper in as much detail as you, so make sure that your report is clear enough that they will not need to have read the paper to understand it. A great referee report not only clearly states the shortcomings of the work, but also lays out constructive and realistic suggestions for improvement if possible. Do not include your recommendation for publication in the report. This [document](#) outlines what your report should include. Please read it carefully before writing your report.

The second document is a recommendation letter to the editor. This can be anywhere between 1-3 paragraphs depending on how much you need to make your point. You should list your recommendation for the paper (reject, revise and resubmit, acceptance) and the key reason for this recommendation.

One of the best ways to learn about how to write a successful job market is to read that of successful past candidates. We have thus selected a number of the best political economy job market papers over the past year for you to select from for the referee reports. Please use the version of the papers

in this [dropbox folder](#), NOT any updated drafts. It is more useful to practice referee reports on less polished papers rather than the final published draft.

- Lydia Assouad (PSE) “Charismatic Leaders and Nation Building”
- Kevin Carney (Harvard) “The Effect of Social Media on Voters: Experimental Evidence from an Indian Election”
- Arkadev Ghosh (UBC) “Religious Divisions and Production Technology: Experimental Evidence from India”
- Nikita Melnikov (Princeton) “Mobile Internet and Political Polarization”
- Juan Felipe Riano (UBC) “Bureaucratic Nepotism”
- Carly Trachtman (Berkeley) "How Much do our Neighbors Really Know? The Limits of Community-Based Targeting"

Please read the below resources prior to writing your referee reports. They provide useful guidance on how to write a successful report – the document linked above gives my opinion, but we have much less experience writing referee reports than any of the below authors! There is also a sample report from a previous year’s class included in the folder so you have a model for how to write these.

- Berk et al, “Preparing a Referee Report: Guidelines and Perspectives”:
<https://www.aeaweb.org/content/file?id=222>
- Bellemare, “Contributing to Public Goods: My 20 Rules for Refereeing”:
<http://marcfbellemare.com/wordpress/5542>
- Chris Blattman 2013 Syllabus (see the last four pages):
<https://chrisblattman.com/files/2009/07/POLS-G8412-Syllabus-Spring-2013-Jan-2013-final.docx>
- https://thepoliticalmethodologist.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/tpm_v23_n1.pdf

The referee report exercise is due on **November 28 by 8:30 am**, i.e., just before class. Please e-mail your referee report and your recommendation letter to the editor to augustin.bergeron@usc.edu and jbweaver@usc.edu.