

Political Economy (PhD level)

Instructor: Jeff Weaver

Course Description:

This course is an upper year field course for economics PhD students. Students are expected to have taken PhD-level econometrics and microeconomics. This course is intended to: 1) familiarize students with the literature in political economy; 2) learn to critically engage the academic literature; 3) equip students with skills that they will need as academic researchers, such as presenting and writing referee reports; and 4) assist students in starting their own research.

The course will meet once per week on Wednesdays from 8:30-11:50am. The format of class will be the following, with some adjustment as the course progresses -

8:30-9:30 or 10:30 am:

- The class will begin with **1 to 2 presentations** on the starred papers by a student (I will do this for the first week). The presentation should last for approximately 35-40 minutes, including interjections and questions by the class, followed by 10 minutes of discussion led by the presenter.

9:30 or 10:30 - 11:30am:

- Following that, we will discuss the remaining papers in turn. I will ask one student to begin the discussion with a pithy 2-4 minute summary of the content of the paper. We will then go through the paper, with me asking questions to guide the conversation. We will spend between 30 and 45 minutes on each of the other papers, depending on their number.
- At around 10:30am, we will take a short break.

11:30-11:50am

- I will give a short preview of the results for the next week and the empirical strategy that the papers are using. The goal is that this should make you prepared to engage more critically and deeply with the paper
- It will also give a brief introduction to the material for the upcoming week and the types of questions that you should keep in mind when reading those papers/thinking of critiques and extensions.

Textbook:

There is no assigned textbook for this class. Material will be based on (occasional) lecture notes and the economics articles listed for each class. However, the following resources may be useful for additional reading.

Olken, Ben and Rohini Pande (2013). [JPAL Governance Initiative Review Paper](#)

Finan, Fred, Olken, Ben and Rohini Pande (2015). The Personnel Economics of the State. NBER Working Paper

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Besley, Tim and Torsten Persson (2011) Pillars of Prosperity, Princeton University Press.

Downs, Anthony (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Boston, MA: Addison Wesley.

Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001) *Special Interest Politics*, MIT Press.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000). *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*. MIT Press.

Daron Acemoglu's (very detailed) [lecture notes](#)

Grading:

You will be graded according to the following outline. In cases where students are at the border between two grade levels, course participation may be taken into account.

Assignment	Requirements	% of Final Grade
Presentations	<p>Each week, 1-2 papers will be presented by either me or a student. These presentations will rotate such that everyone presents the same number of times. Papers will be assigned to students during the first week of class, and each student will present at least 2 times.</p> <p>The presentations should discuss: (i) the research question, motivation, contribution and relationship to the background literature; (ii) the data; (iii) the empirical strategy; (iv) the main results; (v) conclusions and generalizability; (vi) strengths and weaknesses of the paper; and (vii) future directions for research on the topic.</p> <p>The presentations will be followed by 15-20 minutes of questions from the rest of the class and discussion. The presentations will be graded by me.</p>	20%
Written Responses	<p>If you are not presenting in a given week, you must select one of the papers and submit a short, written response to the paper. Responses are due by 8pm on Tuesday night. These responses should be short (1-2 paragraphs) and give critical comments on one paper or comment on research questions that are suggested but not answered by the paper. You can respond to any paper, including the ones that are being presented (the first of the starred papers). You should think of this as the basis of a comment or set of comments you may make during the class discussion.</p>	10%
Class participation	<p>You should actively participate in class discussions on the papers. At a minimum, you should talk/make a comment at least two times per class, and hopefully more than that. This is a good way to practice making comments in a seminars in a hopefully lower stress setting.</p>	20%
Referee Reports (2)	<p>During the semester, students will select two papers from a list of recent job market papers in political economy and write a 2-3 page referee report on those papers. These reports should follow the format of a referee report and be as if you were actually refereeing the paper. Further details can be found below. You do not need to give a written response or presentation during the week that you write a referee report.</p>	10% each

<p>Presentation of research proposal</p>	<p>During the final week of the course/exam period, you will present a proposal for your own original research project. The goal of this assignment is to give you a start on thinking about your dissertation and coming up with a research proposal.</p> <p>In your presentation, you should: 1) describe the research question and why it is of interest (5-8 minutes); 2) summarize the related literature (5 minutes); 3) give a description of your proposed project (20 - 30 minutes). If empirical in nature, this should include an identification strategy and description of your data or planned data collection process.</p> <p>Presentations will be graded on both content and presentation style.</p> <p>You must meet with me about your proposed project at least once before spending much time on it. In order to allow yourself time to put together the project, I have set aside the second half of one class to have individual meetings. However, you should also plan to meet with me during office hours either after or before that meeting so that we can talk in more detail. I would recommend that you start thinking about the project early, and start a list of ideas for possible projects while going through the semester. The best case is that you have a list of possible projects by the time we meet, and then we can work together to decide which is the strongest.</p> <p>Immediately before your presentation, you should send me a copy of your slides so that I can make notes on them. You will not need to turn in anything else written for this assignment (i.e. no written project proposal) – the presentation is the final product. I will give detailed feedback on the presentation and the research idea based on that.</p>	<p>30%</p>
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Auditing the Course

Advanced year PhD students and others are welcome to audit the course. My expectation is that auditors will have read each of the papers prior to class and be ready to discuss them. Depending on the number of enrolled students and auditors, they may also be expected to do one presentation during the course of the semester, but do not have to submit weekly written discussions or any of the other course assignments.

Course Outline:

In the syllabus, required papers are starred with an asterisk (*). Students are expected to have read all starred papers prior to the start of each class. Those papers can be found in [this dropbox folder](#) for download.

Week 1 (January 12): Introduction to Political Economy

I will give an overview of the course and an introduction to the material in the next week.

If you have time, you may find it useful to read Persson and Tabellini (2000) chapters 1-5 to get some background on the theoretical side of political economy. This class will be focused on empirical research, so I will not cover this material. But knowing about the theoretical side helps to motivate empirical research.

Week 2 (January 19): Voter Turnout

To give an example of how your presentations should look, I will give a presentation on the Gerber and Green (2000) paper at the start of class. We will then discuss the remaining papers.

*Gerber, Alan and Donald Green (2000). "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review*, 94, 3, 653-663.

Coate, Stephen, Michael Conlin, and Andrea Moro (2008). "The performance of pivotal-voter models in small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas liquor referenda", *Journal of Public Economics*, 92, 582-596.

Coate, Stephen and Michael Conlin (2004). "A Group Rule-Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence." *American Economic Review*, 94, 5, 1476-1504.

*DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., Malmendier, U., & Rao, G. (2016). Voting to tell others. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 84(1), 143-181.

Fujiwara, T., Meng, K., & Vogl, T. (2016). Habit formation in voting: Evidence from rainy elections. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 8(4), 160-88.

*Gerber, Alan, Donald Green, and Christopher Larimer (2008). "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment", *American Political Science Review*, 102(1), 33-48.

*Washington, Ebonya (2006). "How Black Candidates Affect Voter Turnout", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(3), 973-998.

Week 3 (January 26): Political Preferences

*Alesina, Alberto and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). "Good Bye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences." *American Economic Review*, 97, 4, 1507-1528.

*Edlund, Lena and Rohini Pande (2002). "Why Have Women Become Left-Wing? The Political Gender Gap and the Decline in Marriage," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 917-961.

Kuziemko, I., R. Buell, T. Reich, and M. Norton (2014). "Last-place Aversion: Evidence and Redistributive Implications," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129 (1): 105-149.

E Luttmer (2001). "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution." *Journal of Political Economy*, 109, 3, 500-528.

Manacorda, Marco, Edward Miguel, and Andrea Vigorito. (2011). "Government Transfers and Political Support", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(3), 1-28.

*Mullainathan, Sendhil and Ebonya Washington (2009). "Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Political Attitudes", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(1), 86-111.

Week 4 (February 2): Representative Identity

*Chattopadhyay, Raghendra and Esther Duflo (2004). "Women as Policymakers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica*, 72, 5, 1409-1443.

Beaman, L., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Pande, R., & Topalova, P. (2009). Powerful women: does exposure reduce bias?. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(4), 1497-1540.

*Ferreira, Fernando and Joseph Gyourko (2009). "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from Cities." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124, 1.

*Washington, E. L. (2008). Female socialization: How daughters affect their legislator fathers. *American Economic Review*, 98(1):311-32.

Week 5 (February 9): Representative Agency, and Accountability

*Dal Bó, Ernesto and Martín Rossi (2011). "Term Length and the Effort of Politicians," *Review of Economic Studies*, 78(4), 1237-1263.

Besley, Timothy and Anne Case (1995). "Does Political Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence From Gubernatorial Term Limits," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3), 769-98.

Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane, and Antonio Merlo (2005). "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers." *American Economic Review*, 95:347-373.

*Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2010). "Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audit of local governments," *American Economic Review*, 101, 1274-1311.

*Lee, David, Enrico Moretti and Matthew Butler (2004). "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the US House." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August, 807-859.

Week 6 (February 16): Money in Politics

-I recommend skimming the first 8 pages of Ansolabehere, Stephen, John (2002). "Why is there So Little Money in Politics?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17, 1, 105-130., though we will not discuss it in class

*Spenkuch, Jorg and David Toniatti (2018). "Political Advertising and Election Results". *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (133)4, 1981-2036

*Avis, Eric, Finan, Frederico, Ferraz, Claudio, and Carols Varjao (2017). "Money and Politics: The Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Entry and Competition". *Working Paper*

Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi (2014). "Is it Whom You Know or What you Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process." *American Economic Review*, 104, 12, 3885-3920.

Blanes-Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca and Christian Fons-Roen (2012). "Revolving Door Lobbyists." *American Economic Review*, 102, 7, 3731-3748.

*Finan, Frederico and Laura Schecter (2012) "Vote-Buying and Reciprocity", *Econometrica*, 80(2): 863-881

Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. 'Protection for Sale.' *American Economic Review*. 84(4): 833-850.

Levitt, Steven (1994). "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House", *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(4), 777-798.

Vicente, Pedro (2013), "Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa?" *Economic Journal*.

Week 7 (February 23): Media

*Snyder, James and David Stromberg (2010). "Press Coverage and Political Accountability." *Journal of Political Economy* 118(2).

*Chen, Yuyu and Yang, David (2019). "The Impact of Media Censorship: 1984 or Brave New World?". *American Economic Review*, 109(6)

*Levy, Ro'ee. (2021). "Social Media, News Consumption, and Polarization: Evidence from a Field Experiment" . *American Economic Review*, 111(3)

*Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J. M., & Sinkinson, M. (2011). The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics. *American Economic Review*, 101(7), 2980-3018.

Paluck, Elizabeth and Don Green (2009). "Deference, Dissent and Dispute Resolution: An Experimental Intervention Using Mass Media to Change Norms and Behavior in Rwanda." *American Political Science Review*, 103, 4, 622-644.

Week 8 (March 2): Institutions and Institutional Persistence

*Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. Robinson (2001). "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *The American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369-1401.

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4), 1231-1294.

Banerjee, Abhijit and Iyer, Lakshmi (2005) "History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." *American Economic Review*, 95, 1190-1213.

Bleakley, Hoyt and Lin, Jeffrey "Portage and Path Dependence". *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May 2012, volume 127, pp. 587-644.

*Dell, M. (2010). The persistent effects of Peru's mining mita. *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903

Nunn, N. (2008). The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 139-176.

Engerman, S. L., & Sokoloff, K. L. (2002). "Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development among new world economies" (No. w9259). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Week 9 (March 9): Democracy and Democratization

*Olken, B. A. (2010). Direct democracy and local public goods: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. *American Political Science Review*, 104(02), 243-267.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Pierre Yared. (2008). "Income and Democracy", *American Economic Review*, 98(3), 808-842.

Acemoglu, D. (2006). *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Cambridge University Press (pgs. 99-203)

Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria and Gerard Pedro i Miguel (2013). "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya." *American Economic Review*, 105, 6, 1817-51.

*Dal Bó, Pedro, Andrew Foster and Louis Putterman (2010). "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy." *American Economic Review*, 100, 2205-2229.

*Martinez-Bravo, M., i Miquel, G. P., Qian, N., & Yao, Y. (2014). *Political Reform in China: The Effect of Local Elections*.

Pande, R. (2011). Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies. *Annu. Rev. Econ.*, 3(1), 215-237.

Week 10 (March 23): Corruption

*Ferraz, Claudio, and Fred Finan. (2008). "Exposing Corruption politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2), 703-745.

Bai, J., Jayachandran, S., Malesky, E. and Olken, B. (2014). "Does Economic Growth Reduce Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Vietnam." NBER Working Paper #19483

Bertrand, Marianne, Djankov, Simeon, Hanna, Rema and Mullainathan, Sendhil, (2007) "Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1639-1676

Burgess, Robin, Matthew Hansen, Benjamin Olken, Peter Potapov, and Stefanie Sieber, "The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4): 1707-1754.

Di Tella, Rafael and Ernesto Schargrotsky (2003). "The Role of Wages and Auditing During a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires," Journal of Law and Economics, 46: 269-292.

Fisman, Raymond and Yongxian Wang (2015). "The Mortality Cost of Political Connections." Review of Economic Studies, 2015, 82, 4, 1346-1382.

Muralidharan, K., Niehaus, P., & Sukhtankar, S. (2016). Building state capacity: Evidence from biometric smartcards in India. American Economic Review, 106(10), 2895-2929.

Niehaus, Paul, and Sandip Sukhtankar (2013). "Corruption dynamics: The golden goose effect." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5.4: 230-69.

*Olken, Benjamin (2007). "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," Journal of Political Economy, 115, 2, 200-249.

*Olken, Benjamin and Barron, Patrick (2009), "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh", Journal of Political Economy 117(3), 417-452.

Week 11 (March 30): Political Influences on Economic Outcomes/Clientelism

***For this class, we will spend the first hour going through the two below starred papers. The remaining 2.5 hours will be devoted to meeting with you individually for 15-20 minutes to discuss your ideas for the research proposals. ***

Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal (2015). "Clientelism in Indian Villages." American Economic Review, 105(6): 1780-1816.

*Fisman, Ray (2001). "Estimating the Value of Political Connections", American Economic Review, 91: 1095-1102.

Dube, Arin, Ethan Kaplan, and Suresh Naidu (2011). "Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(3), 1-35.

*Khwaja, Asim, and Atif Mian. (2005). "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4).

Martinez-Bravo, M. 2014. "The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia." American Economic Review, 104(4): 1244-87.

Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny (1992). "Politicians and Firms", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 995-1026.

Week 12 (April 6): Bureaucrats

If you have not done any referee reports yet, you need to do one this week.

*Duflo, E., Hanna, R., & Ryan, S. P. (2012). Incentives work: Getting teachers to come to school. The American Economic Review, 1241-1278.

Banerjee, A. V., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Keniston, D., & Singh, N. (2012). Can institutions be reformed from within? Evidence from a randomized experiment with the Rajasthan police.

*Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., & Rossi, M. A. (2013). Strengthening state capabilities: The role of financial incentives in the call to public service. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(3), 1169-1218.

Dhaliwal, Iqbal, and Rema Hanna (2017). Deal with the Devil: The Successes and Limitations of Bureaucratic Reform in India. Journal of Development Economics

*Khan, A., Khwaja, A., and Olken, B. (2016). "Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 131(1), 219-271.

Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V. (2011). Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India. Journal of Political Economy, 119(1), 39-77.

Olken, B, F. Finan & R Pande (2016) "The Personnel Economics of the State" Handbook of Field Economics

Rasul, Imran and Daniel Rogger. 2015. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service." Working Paper

Week 13 (April 13): Conflict

*Berman, Eli, Jacob Shapiro, and Joseph Felter (2011) "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Journal of Political Economy, 119(4): 766-819.

Abadie, Alberto and Javier Garbeazabal (2003), "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country," American Economic Review 93.

Blattman, Christopher and Miguel, Edward (2010). "Civil War" The Journal of Economic Literature. 48(1): 3-57.

Ciccone, A. (2011). Economic shocks and civil conflict: A comment. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(4), 215-227.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoffler (1998), "On economic causes of civil war," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50: 563-573.

*Dell, M. (2015). Trafficking networks and the Mexican drug war. *The American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1738-1779.

Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013). Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4), 1384-1421.

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003), "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review*, 97(1):75-90.

*Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004). Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach. *Journal of political Economy*, 112(4), 725-753.

Nunn, N., & Qian, N. (2014). US food aid and civil conflict. *The American Economic Review*, 104(6), 1630-1666. [note reply of Barrett and Christian (2017)]

Reynal-Querol, M., & Montalvo, J. G. (2005). Ethnic polarization, potential conflict and civil war. *American Economic Review*, 95(3), 796-816.

Week 14 (April 20): TBD depending on student enrollment

April 27 and Exam Time: Student Presentations on Research Projects

During these weeks, we will have 3-4 students per class present their research proposals

Referee Reports:

Writing referee reports is an important task on which graduate students frequently do not receive much training. This is an important way in which you can contribute to the profession and improve the research of others. It is also good practice in reading a paper carefully and deconstructing its argument.

Whenever doing a referee report, you should prepare two documents. The first is the referee report, which should be 2-3 pages double-spaced. The report has three main parts:

- One paragraph summary of the main argument of the article
- 2-4 major comments on the paper, where you discuss important positives or drawbacks of the paper. These should each be around a paragraph in length.
- Finally, you should conclude the report with minor comments. These can be 1-3 sentences, and refer to more minor points about the paper.

When writing the reports, always consider your audience – you are writing these to the author and editor. The editor will likely not have read the paper in as much detail as you, so make sure that your report is clear enough that they will not need to have read the paper to understand it. A good referee report not only clearly states the shortcomings of the work, but also lays out constructive, detailed and realistic suggestions for improvement. Do not include your recommendation for publication in the report. This [document](#) outlines what your report should include. Please read it carefully before writing your report.

The second document is a recommendation letter to the editor. This can be anywhere between 1-3 paragraphs depending on how much you need to make your point. You should list your recommendation for the paper (reject, revise and resubmit, acceptance) and the key reason for this recommendation.

One of the best ways to learn about how to write a successful job market is to read that of successful past candidates. I have thus selected a number of the best political economy job market papers over the past year for you to select from for the referee reports. Please use the version of the papers in this [dropbox folder](#), NOT any updated drafts. It is more useful to practice referee reports on less polished papers rather than the final published draft.

- **Augustin Bergeron (Harvard)**. “The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence from Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC”
- **Milena Djourelova (UPF)**. “Media Persuasion through Slanted Language: Evidence from the Coverage of Immigration”
- **Teresa Esteban-Casanelles (Columbia)**. “The Effects of Exposure to Electoral Advertising: Evidence from Spain”
- **Lisa Tarquinio (BU)**. “The Politics of Drought Relief: Evidence from Southern India”
- **Martin Mattsson (Yale)**. “Service Delivery, Corruption and Information Flows in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service”
- **Jonah Rexer (UPenn)**. “The local advantage: Corruption, organized crime, and indigenization in the Nigerian oil sector”
- **MR Sharan (Harvard)**. “Something to complain about: How minority representatives overcome ethnic differences”

- **Gabriel Tourek (Harvard)**. “Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the DR Congo”
- **Silvia Vannutelli (BU)**. “From Lapdogs to Watchdogs: Random Auditor Assignment and Municipal Fiscal Performance in Italy”

Please read these resources prior to writing your referee reports. They provide useful guidance on how to write a successful report. I will also send you a sample report from last year’s class so you have a model for how to write these.

- Berk et al, “Preparing a Referee Report: Guidelines and Perspectives”:
<https://www.aeaweb.org/content/file?id=222>
- Bellemare, “Contributing to Public Goods: My 20 Rules for Refereeing”:
<http://marcfbellemare.com/wordpress/5542>
- Chris Blattman 2013 Syllabus (see the last four pages):
<https://chrisblattman.com/files/2009/07/POLS-G8412-Syllabus-Spring-2013-Jan-2013-final.docx>
- https://thepoliticalmethodologist.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/tpm_v23_n1.pdf