

POIR 680: International Security

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Spring 2016

Meetings: Thursdays, 2 - 4:50pm, THH 115

Description

Let me start with two things this course is not. First, it is not a classics course—no Thucydides, no Clausewitz, no Waltz, no Keohane, no Wendt. The old paradigms (realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc.) are not dead, but they are dying, and the remaining contribution they have to make is increasingly marginal. Second, this is not a comprehensive course, or even a representative survey—the literature on international security is vast, and we cannot even cover all the major branches of it.

The syllabus instead reflects a selection of the most prominent and, in my judgment, the most promising branches of research in this field. Most of the papers listed below are either seminal or have the potential to be. They are chosen to span the active modes of theorizing about international security, including economic, sociological, and psychological theories. They also should give you a sense of the different approaches to empirical investigation, including statistical analysis of large datasets, historical analysis and process tracing of one or a few cases, the grey “medium-n” approach in between, and the more recent use of survey and lab experiments. Finally, these papers represent several different ways of contributing to the field, including identifying a puzzle, unifying previous strands of theory, constructing a new dataset, testing competing theories, and improving methods of research.

Some of the tools employed in the readings, like game theory or certain statistical methods, may be unfamiliar to you. And in some cases it may also be unclear to you—as it may have been at the time to the author—what the lasting contributions of a seminal paper are. For these reasons, this will not be a pure discussion class: I will use part of each meeting to try to bring you up to speed on relevant methods and to present the most important conclusions of the papers.

Contacting Me: You can email me at any time, and I will try to respond within a day, though exceptions will happen. You can also email me to set up a time to come by my office and talk.

Students with Disabilities: Any student requesting academic accommodations based on a disability is required to register with Disability Services and Programs (DSP) each semester. A letter of verification for approved accommodations can be obtained from DSP. Please be sure the letter is delivered to me as early in the semester as possible.

Academic Integrity: Don't lie, cheat, or steal. Plagiarism is all three (think about it). Also, don't abet the bad behavior of others. Get caught doing any of these and the penalty is an F in the course, *at minimum*. For more detail, see the Trojan Integrity Guide and the related guide to avoiding plagiarism.

Requirements

Preparation and Participation (25%): Careful, thorough reading of the assigned papers before class and participating thoughtfully in class are essential to the value of this course—*that is why so few readings are assigned each week*.

Presentation (25%): Each of you will get 30 minutes at the end of one class to teach us a paper of your choice. It can be any paper on international security (broadly interpreted) published in a top journal. We'll schedule this a few weeks into the class.

Research Paper (50%): This should pose a realistic research question and present a *preliminary* answer. In line with most journals' requirements, it must be no more than 35 pages, including everything except any appendices, double-spaced in 12pt font with one-inch margins, and formatted according to current convention. We'll talk more about the details for this as the semester proceeds, but it will be due on May 2.

Methods References

This course is primarily intended to help you become proficient at reading the literature on international security. Gaining this proficiency does not require previous experience with applied mathematics, and you do not need to learn the details of the mathematical techniques employed. However, you do need to grasp the underlying concepts of these techniques: what problems they are intended to solve, when these problems arise, and how to judge the strengths and weaknesses of the technique's application.

The lectures presented in class will help, but you may also need to consult a reference to reinforce the lectures or find further explanation. The books listed below cover the most widely-used techniques and are recommended for students like yourselves.

- Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, *Mastering 'Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect*. Princeton University Press, 2014. Covers five widely-used methods of statistical causal inference, at an elementary level.

- Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton University Press, 2008. Covers the same five methods as above, but with more of the technical details.
- Stephen Morgan and Christopher Winship, *Counterfactuals and Causal Inference: Methods and Principles for Social Research*. Cambridge University Press, 2014. More thorough, more detailed reference on causal inference.
- Nolan McCarty and Adam Meirowitz. *Political Game Theory*. Cambridge University Press, 2007. Up-to-date introduction to game theory using examples from political science.
- Alpha Chiang and Kevin Wainwright. *Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics*. McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2004. Covers optimization theory (needed for game theory and statistics) and other useful mathematical techniques.

Schedule and Readings

Readings are to be completed by the beginning of class on the date listed. Some of the readings build in a sequence: it will be easier to understand them if you read them in the order listed.

January 13: Why Learning about International Security Is Hard

- Nathaniel Beck, Gary King, and Langche Zeng. “Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture.” *American Political Science Review* 94.1 (2000): 21–35.
- Dan Reiter, Allan Stam, and Michael Horowitz. “A Revised Look at Interstate Wars, 1816–2007.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* forthcoming (2014).
- John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. “Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations.” *European Journal of International Relations* 19.3 (2013): 427–457.
- Alan Gerber, Donald Green, and Edward Kaplan. “The Illusion of Learning from Observational Research.” Working paper (2003).

SKIM:

- Meredith Sarkees. “The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars.” Working paper (2010).
- Glenn Palmer et al. “The MID4 Dataset, 2002–2010: Procedures, Coding Rules and Description.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32.2 (2015): 222–242.
- Nils Petter Gleditsch et al. “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 39.5 (2002): 615–637.

January 20: Rationalist Theory of Conflict

- James Fearon. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization* 49.3 (1995): 379–314.

- Andrew Kydd. “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation.” *International Organization* 54.2 (2000): 325–357.
- Stephen Walt. “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies.” *International Security* 23.4 (1999): 5–48.
- Robert Powell. “The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies.” *International Security* 24.2 (1999): 97–106.

January 27: Psychological Theories of Conflict

- Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth. “Reputation and Status as Motives for War.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014): 371–393.
- Allan Dafoe and Devin Caughey. “Honor and War: Southern U.S. Presidents and the Effects of Concern for Reputation.” *World Politics* 68.2 (2016).
- Rose McDermott. “Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses from the First Decade.” *Political Psychology* 25.2 (2004): 289–312.
- Rose McDermott and Jacek Kugler. “Comparing Rational Choice and Prospect Theory Analyses: The US Decision to Launch Operation ‘Desert Storm,’ January 1991.” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24.3 (2001): 49–85.
- Christopher Butler. “Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51.2 (2007): 227–250.

February 3: (Quasi-)Experimental Methods

- Susan Hyde. “Experiments in International Relations: Lab, Survey, and Field.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2015): 403–424.
- Michael Tomz. “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach.” *International Organization* 61.4 (2007): 821–840.
- Joshua Kertzer and Ryan Brutger. “Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory.” *American Journal of Political Science* forthcoming (2015).
- Dustin Tingley and Stephanie Wang. “Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5.3 (2010): 243–255.
- Dustin Tingley and Barbara Walter. “Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55.6 (2011): 996–1020.
- Jonathan Renshon. “Losing Face and Sinking Costs: Experimental Evidence on the Judgment of Political and Military Leaders.” *International Organization* 69.3 (2015): 659–695.

February 10: Domestic Politics and Conflict I: Evidence

- Donald Green, Soo Yeon Kim, and David Yoon. “Dirty Pool.” *International Organization* 55.2 (2001): 441–468.
- John Oneal and Bruce Russett. “Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace.” *International Organization* 55.2 (2001): 469–485.

- Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz. “Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater: A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon.” *International Organization* 55.2 (2001): 487–495.
- Gary King. “Proper Nouns and Methodological Propriety: Pooling Dyads in International Relations Data.” *International Organization* 55.2 (2001): 497–507.
- Michael Tomz and Jessica Weeks. “Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace.” *American Political Science Review* 107.4 (2013): 849–865.

February 17: Domestic Politics and Conflict II: Theory

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace.” *American Political Science Review* 93.4 (1999): 791–807.
- Alexandre Debs and Hein Goemans. “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War.” *American Political Science Review* 104.3 (2010): 430–445.
- Ahmer Tarar and Bahar Leventoglu. “Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining.” *International Studies Quarterly* 53.3 (2009): 817–839.
- Jessica Weeks. “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict.” *American Political Science Review* 106.2 (2012): 326–347.
- Alexandre Debs and Jessica Chen Weiss. “Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* forthcoming (2015).

February 24: Economics and Conflict

- Erik Gartzke. “The Capitalist Peace.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51.1 (2007): 166–191.
- Allan Dafoe. “Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor.” *American Journal of Political Science* 55.2 (2011): 247–262.
- Allan Dafoe and Nina Kelsey. “Observing the Capitalist Peace: Examining Market-Mediated Signaling and Other Mechanisms.” *Journal of Peace Research* 51.5 (2014): 619–633.
- Patrick McDonald. “The Purse Strings of Peace.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51.3 (2007): 569–582.
- Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro. “An Economic Theory of War.” Working paper (2015).
- Andrew Coe. “The Modern Economic Peace.” Working paper (2015).

March 3: Arming

- Correlates of War Project. *National Military Capabilities Data Documentation Version 4.0* (2010).
- William Nordhaus, John Oneal, and Bruce Russett. “The Effects of the International Security Environment on National Military Expenditures: A Multicountry Study.” *International Organization* 66.3 (2012): 491–513.
- James Fearon. “Cooperation and Conflict under Anarchy.” Working paper (2015).
- Andrew Kydd. “Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective.” *American Journal of Political Science* 44.2 (2000): 228–244.

- Andrew Coe and Jane Vaynman. “The Tragedy of Arming.” Working paper (2015).

March 10: Economic Sanctions

- Jonathan Eaton and Maxim Engers. “Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics.” *American Economic Review* 89.2 (1999): 409–414.
- Daniel Drezner. “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion.” *International Organization* 57.3 (2003): 643–659.
- Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat, and Valentin Kristen. “The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971–2000.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26.1 (2009): 92–110.
- Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. “Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and Credibility.” *Journal of Politics* 68.2 (2006): 248–258.
- Andrew Coe. “Sanctions as Instruments of Regime Change.” Working paper (2015).

SPRING BREAK

March 24: Norms

- James Morrow. *Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution*. Cambridge University Press (2014).

March 31: Institutions

- Terrence Chapman. “Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy.” *International Organization* 63.4 (2009): 733–764.
- Terrence Chapman and Scott Wolford. “International Organizations, Strategy, and Crisis Bargaining.” *Journal of Politics* 72.1 (2010): 227–242.
- Songying Fang, Jesse Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. “To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances.” *International Organization* 68.4 (2014): 775–809.
- Scott Wolford. “Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining.” *American Journal of Political Science* 58.1 (2014): 144–156.
- Scott Wolford. “Power, Preferences, and Balancing: The Durability of Coalitions and the Expansion of Conflict.” *International Studies Quarterly* 58.1 (2014): 146–157.

April 7: Diplomacy

- Shuhei Kurizaki. “Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy.” *American Political Science Review* 101.3 (2007): 543–558.
- Robert Trager. “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters.” *American Political Science Review* 104.2 (2010): 347–368.
- Robert Trager. “Multidimensional Diplomacy.” *International Organization* 65.3 (2011): 469–506.
- Robert Trager. “Diplomatic Signaling among Multiple States.” *Journal of Politics* 77.3 (2015): 635–647.

- Robert Trager. “Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy: European Relations after Austrian Crimean War Threats.” *Security Studies* 21.2 (2012): 232–265.
- Michael Gill and Arthur Spirling. “Dimensions of Diplomacy: Understanding Private Information in International Relations Using the Wikileaks Cable Disclosure.” Working paper (2015).

April 14: PRESENT WORK IN PROGRESS ON PAPERS

April 21: Nuclear Weapons

- Alexander Montgomery and Scott Sagan. “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53.2 (2009): 302–328.
- Andrew Coe and Jane Vaynman. “Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.” *Journal of Politics* 77.4 (2015): 983–997.
- Hal Brands and David Palkki. “Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?” *International Security* 36.1 (2011): 133–166.
- Muhammet Bas and Andrew Coe. “Nuclear Russian Roulette: A Model of Proliferation and Preventive War.” Working paper (2015).
- Daryl Press, Scott Sagan, and Benjamin Valentino. “Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons.” *American Political Science Review* 107.1 (2013): 188–206.

April 28: Intervention

- Virginia Fortna. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 48.2 (2004): 269–292.
- John Owen IV. “The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions.” *International Organization* 56.2 (2002): 375–409.
- Andrew Kydd. “When Can Mediators Build Trust?” *American Political Science Review* 100.3 (2006): 449–462.