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Nuclear weapons are the single most devastating tool of war that, if used, could literally destroy a viable society or even generate a global catastrophe. Classical deterrence, defined as the threat of unacceptable nuclear retaliation following an initial attack, was conceived to avert nuclear war. Since 1945, the terror generated by sequential deterrence postures is credited for the non-use of nuclear weapons. Classical deterrence policy is a success because under Massive Retaliation, and later under Mutual Assured Destruction, the international system has averted a nuclear war.

This success is not totally consistent with theory. Classical deterrence implies that nuclear proliferation and the buildup of nuclear arsenals ensures terror, and that in turn terror secures stability. Yet policymakers who adopted deterrence have universally rejected nuclear proliferation as a prescription for peace. Thus only half of the logical implications of deterrence have been implemented: Build nuclear arsenals to secure peace, but prevent the buildup of nuclear arsenals by third parties because they challenge peace. Moreover, this inconsistency reduces the credibility of deterrence arguments and limits anti-proliferation efforts. North Korea or Iran and the rising specter of a nuclear terrorist threat directly challenge classical deterrence’s stable view of the international system. Are these developments dangerous, or will they stabilize the Middle East and East Asia?

Kugler will present arguments showing that nuclear deterrence is tenuous. He will show that the original conception of classical nuclear deterrence is internally flawed and underspecified. Restructuring nuclear deterrence to include risk propensity and trust in the status quo shows the likely conditions for deterrence failure.

1. Nuclear war can be successfully deterred between nuclear powers when one has overwhelming asymmetric superiority.

2. Limited nuclear war is possible between a very week nuclear entity (i.e., a terrorist) facing overwhelming conventional asymmetry.

3. Major nuclear war is possible between powerful nuclear entities facing conventional parity.

The policy implications are profound. Mutual Assured Destruction is not stable. Terrorist nuclear attacks are not deterred by the buildup of nuclear arsenals.

What can be done? Technological breakthroughs make it impossible to unlearn how nuclear devices are made and to ensure that they can be eliminated from our environment. It is imperative therefore to limit, as much as possible, the likelihood of conflict. Kugler proposes a novel policy to insure stability: Create a Nuclear Security Council consisting of the few nuclear nations which have Global Massive Retaliation that can act independently to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war.

About the Speaker

Jacek Kugler is the Elisabeth Helm Rosecrans Professor of World Politics in the Department of Politics and Policy, School of Politics and Economics at Claremont Graduate University. He is the editor of International Interactions and past president of the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society. He founded the Sentia Group Inc., dedicated to the formal study of decision-making, policy analysis and advice. He has been a consultant to the IMF, the World Bank, the State Department, the Department of Defense and a number of U.S agencies and private businesses. His research has been funded by the NSF, DARPA and the Ford Foundation, among other institutions. Through extensive publications on the causes and consequences of war, Kugler has forged a reputation for innovative formal modeling and empirical analysis.