Course Objectives

This course will examine the dynamics of politics and policymaking in our democratic society – how elections and pressures shape policy and how the fallout of policy reshapes the political landscape. Some leaders maneuver through the electoral and political thicket to achieve a desired outcome. For example, Abraham Lincoln used an appealing and largely contrived rationale – military necessity – to advance the process of emancipation by refusing to return fugitive slaves to their Southern owners. That rationale ultimately led to a general emancipation which otherwise would have been decidedly unpopular with the public and imperiled Lincoln's reelection in 1864. Some candidates make popular commitments which cannot be delivered – and that in turn impacts both politics and policy, often in fundamental ways. Entrenched assumptions can challenge the capacity both to win and to govern. We will explore this in the series of case studies, ranging from the balanced budget orthodoxy, immigration reform, and the car tax in California and Virginia, to Reagan, Romney, and Trump on abortion and social issues and the “Vietnamization” of American politics over nearly two-thirds of a century. The case studies are disparate, but point to a consistent reality: public policy isn’t made solely on the merits, in a political vacuum; conversely, and in the longer-term, the unintended, or unattended, consequences of an expedient, politically driven policy choice can upend the balance of political power and shift the range of politically viable policy options.

In addition, students will be divided into teams (the number in each team will depend on the size of the class). Each team will be assigned to develop a sustainable political/policy strategy in a different area. The teams will present their recommendations in class and be questioned by the professor, a guest expert, and other students.

Course Requirements and Grading

Student grades will be based on the following components. Late assignments will be accepted if students, for good reason, have sought an extension in advance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
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<tr>
<td>Class Participation: 20%</td>
<td>Since classroom discussion is an integral part of the class, students are expected to read and think about the assigned readings in advance. Class attendance is important; if you need to miss a class, please email the instructor in advance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid-Semester Memo: 40%</td>
<td><strong>Format:</strong> Memos must be 7-10 double-spaced pages with one-inch margins, to be submitted in class on <strong>March 2nd</strong>. See page 34 for a list of possible memo topics.</td>
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Format: There will be one presentation with PowerPoint (or its equivalent) in each of the last ten classes covering specific topic areas designated on pages 2-3. Each team will have 50 minutes to present and will then be questioned by the instructor and a guest expert and other students.

Course Readings
The following books are required:
- Robert Shrum, No Excuses (Note: Professor Shrum will provide copies of the paperback)
- David Mixner, Stranger Among Friends
- Jonathan Alter, The Promise: President Obama, Year One
- Sam Roberts, ed., America’s Mayor: John V. Lindsay and the Reinvention of New York
- Other readings will be posted on blackboard.

Course Outline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
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<tr>
<td>1+2</td>
<td>Jan. 10/12</td>
<td>Lincoln and Slavery</td>
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<td>3+4</td>
<td>Jan. 17/19</td>
<td>“Balanced” Budgets from FDR to Trump</td>
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<tr>
<td>5+6</td>
<td>NO CLASS/ Jan. 26/31</td>
<td>John Lindsay: Liberal Dreams and Urban Realities</td>
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<td>7+8</td>
<td>Feb. 2/7</td>
<td>Reagan, Romney, Trump, and Social Issues</td>
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<td>9+10</td>
<td>Feb. 9/14</td>
<td>Politics and Policy in the Advance of Gay Rights in America</td>
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<td>11+12</td>
<td>Feb. 16/21</td>
<td>The Virginia &amp; California Car Tax Battles</td>
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<td>13+14</td>
<td>Feb. 23 Feb. 28</td>
<td>From Clintoncare and Welfare Reform to Obamacare and the Aftermath</td>
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<td>15+16</td>
<td>Mar. 2/7</td>
<td>Immigration: Solution, Stalemate, and Political Fallout</td>
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<td>17+18</td>
<td>Mar. 9/21</td>
<td>The “Vietnamization” of American Politics</td>
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<td>19+20</td>
<td>Mar. 23/28</td>
<td>Stormy Weather: the Politics of Energy Policy and Climate Change*</td>
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<td>21+22</td>
<td>Apr. 4/6</td>
<td>Policing the Police: Policy Options and Political Viability*</td>
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<td>23+24</td>
<td>Apr. 11/13</td>
<td>Prop 13, California’s Fiscal Challenges and the 2018 Election*</td>
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<tr>
<td>25+26</td>
<td>Apr. 20</td>
<td>Trade Politics and Trade Policy in the Trump Era</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Apr. 25</td>
<td>Trump and the GOP: Beyond the First Hundred Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Apr. 27</td>
<td>Democratic Priorities, Democratic Strategy and a Looming Midterm Election</td>
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*Teams will present at these classes.

Please Note: The readings are subject to change depending on events.

**Classes 1 & 2: Lincoln and Slavery: His real view and the limits imposed by political realities**

The interaction between policymaking and politics is as old as government itself. We will begin with an issue more than 150 years in the past. There is arguably evidence that Lincoln always opposed slavery and wanted, as he said, to “put it on the path to extinction”; but the need for unity in the North at the outset of the Civil War militated against any immediate action on the issue. How did Lincoln maneuver to preserve his political viability from the start of his career to his 1864 re-election? What was the impact of Lincoln’s promise, both before he was elected and in his First Inaugural Address, not to disturb slavery where it already existed? What stratagems did Lincoln adopt that advanced the long-term purpose of abolishing slavery and shortened the timeframe in which this could be accomplished? How did changing events – and Lincoln’s manipulation of events – lead to the Emancipation Proclamation and then the 13th amendment to the Constitution?

**Required readings:**

**Classes 3 and 4: “Balanced” Budgets from FDR to Barack Obama**

In 1932, in a speech in Pittsburgh, candidate Franklin Roosevelt promised to fight the Great Depression by cutting the federal budget 25%. Instead, in the next four years his Administration ran soaring deficits. As he was returning to Pittsburgh in the 1936 campaign, Roosevelt asked his speechwriter, Sam Rosenman, to reconcile his record with his 1932 speech. Rosenman replied: “The only thing we can come up with is deny you ever said it.” During this period, Roosevelt met with John Maynard Keynes, who had made the path-breaking argument for countercyclical fiscal policy; Keynes concluded that Roosevelt didn’t understand and didn’t seem interested in what he was saying. In 1937, Roosevelt, who was drawn to the prevailing wisdom of a balanced budget, proposed a budget that sharply cut the deficit and provoked a steep economic downturn. Amid mounting political pressures, he quickly returned to deficit spending without justifying the shift on any larger policy grounds. World War II brought full recovery.

For the generation that followed, American presidents and presidential candidates fervently professed their belief in balanced budgets and sometimes followed that belief even when it apparently brought on or deepened recession – for example, three times under President Eisenhower. It was not until President Kennedy’s 1962 speech at Yale University rejecting “old ideas” and defending proactive fiscal stimulus that a president explicitly said (even if at times some had actually carried out the policy) that in downturns, deficits could be good for the economy. When Richard Nixon took office in 1969 events prevented him from taking immediate action to balance the budget. He bounced back and forth between different fiscal policies until, in
the face of a recession in 1970 and heading toward a reelection campaign in 1972, Nixon quipped: “We are all Keynesians now.”

Why is the balanced budget’s hold on political culture so powerful (e.g., FDR’s and then Eisenhower’s comment that “the government is like a family; it has to live within its means”)? How have Presidents successfully deviated in policy terms from the rhetorical framework which continues to reinforce the notion that a balanced budget is an inherent public good? What pressures led Kennedy – and what events permitted him – to admit and argue for the desirability of countercyclical fiscal policy? Was Nixon’s economic policy – from deficit spending to wage and price controls – purely a political response or a defensible, even essential, policy option?

After a period of massive deficits under Ronald Regan, who simultaneously and fervently professed his belief in a balanced budget constitutional amendment, Bill Clinton achieved the elusive goal of eliminating deficits and in the process seemed to reaffirm the status of balanced budgets as an inherent public good. The subsequent Bush deficits, driven by the tax cuts, two unpaid for wars, and an unpaid for Medicaid prescription drug benefit, would soon be exacerbated by the crash of 2008.

Barack Obama entered office in the face of the gravest financial crisis since the Great Depression. He introduced and pushed through the largest fiscal stimulus in U.S. history. Given Obama’s politically calculated decision to violate but not frontally challenge the balanced budget orthodoxy, it reasserted itself before economic circumstances warranted fiscal tightening. Did the President give a politically necessary – or economically misconceived – symbolic ratification of the orthodoxy when in the 2011 State of the Union message he proposed a freeze on certain federal programs and a line-item veto? Consider what happened after the stimulus: When Obama confronted fiscal attacks on his health care plan, he promised not to add to the deficit. Why did he temper his rhetoric about fiscal policy? Could he have chosen the JFK course in 1962? Alternatively, as the debt and Eurozone crises and a slowing in China endangered global recovery, how did the political calculations of 2012 shape policy outcomes? How did the sequester happen, and how was it effectively overcome in 2015? Finally, did President Obama, with the help of the Federal Reserve Board’s accommodative monetary policy, successfully navigate the ingrained hostility to deficits and debt? Or was his political strategy just another way of ducking a forthright discussion of the economic realities? What mattered more in the 2008, 2012, and 2016 presidential elections – the popular appeal of the balanced budget orthodoxy or the issue of jobs and economic recovery? How did the pace and quality of the recovery reshape the policies of 2016. What will be the impact of the Trump administration on fiscal policy and the economy – and thus on politics moving forward?

We will also consider the anti-Keynesian case – that cuts in a downturn or a time of sluggish growth actually help the economy by contributing to investor, business, and even consumer confidence. How does this answer Keynes’s central critique that the only path out of recession is to stimulate demand because companies don’t hire and produce because they feel good, but because there are consumers willing to buy their products? This debate led to a nearly toxic brew of policy and politics in earlier confrontations over extending the debt ceiling and shutting down the government. Has Trump’s election obviated the threat a future government shutdown or holding the debt-ceiling hostage? Are we past that? Given the embedded nature of popular
assumptions about economics (for example, that cutting spending will create jobs), will the political process inevitably drive leaders toward austerity even in the face of possible recession? That’s what seems to have happened in Britain after the election of 2010 – and Britain’s economy, which was growing then, fell into or hovered close to repeated downturns. Is there any reason to believe that the deleterious effects of such an approach, presuming it fails, will over time realign political attitudes about the uses of deficits and economic stimulation?

Readings (subject to change/update):
6. John F Kennedy, Public Papers of the Presidents 1962, Speech at Yale University, pp. 471-472.
Classes 5 and 6: Politics and Policy in the Advance of Gay Rights in America

In 1978, the initiative banning gay school teachers in California seemed headed for victory as part of a trend that began with a similar proposal spearheaded by former Miss America contestant and popular singer Anita Bryant in Dade County, Florida. But the California initiative was soundly defeated, and one of the turning points was former Governor Ronald Reagan’s decision to oppose it. What argument persuaded Reagan to reject what many would have assumed to be his predictable position? And what does that tell campaigners about how to make their cases in apparently difficult circumstances?

In 1980, the Democratic Convention approved the first major party platform plank pledging to guarantee equality regardless of sexual orientation. In the decade that followed, the AIDS epidemic plunged the gay community into crisis. Policymakers, especially on the right, had to determine how to address this new problem. Could they support legislation funding research and prevention against a disease that disproportionately affected gay men while publicly continuing to condemn their lifestyle? For many, the simple answer was to avoid the issue entirely. Ronald Reagan, who had opposed Proposition 6 in 1978, refused to even say the word “AIDS” in public until 1985. While the CDC studied the disease throughout the decade, widespread government action didn’t come until after 1987, when President Reagan gave his first speech about the epidemic to the Third International Conference on AIDS. How did politics, and the “moral” beliefs of legislators and their constituents affect policy towards the AIDS epidemic? What policy response would have been appropriate, and could it have been sold to the country, the Republican base, and enacted during the Reagan revolution? In light of government ambivalence, how did non-governmental organizations attempt to fight the AIDS epidemic? Is this a viable model for other types of reform? How did Ted Kennedy finally break the legislative gridlock on HIV/AIDS?
While campaigning for president in 1992, Bill Clinton promised to reform federal policy toward gays in the military. Once in office, Clinton attempted to forge a compromise that would fulfill his campaign promise to the gay community without alienating the Joint Chiefs or social conservatives. He was determined to avoid an early loss, especially on what he considered to be a relatively insignificant issue. Thus was born “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” (DADT), a compromise measure that angered Clinton’s liberal base while failing to assuage the ire of the right. Why did Clinton promise action on gays in the military during the campaign instead of proposing, for instance, to end workplace discrimination? What policy should he have pursued? What was right politically? Had he acted differently, could an early loss have actually helped Clinton?

In 1996, Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act – DOMA. (In fact, there was only one Democrat running for reelection who opposed it, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry.) Was the national consensus so opposed to gay rights and so hostile that it was politically impossible to resist the bill? Or was signing it politically opportune, has especially in contested Southern states, where Clinton broadcast ads about his position? He’s since said that signing DOMA was a profound mistake. Did politics play a part in this too?

In the first decade of the new century, the debate over gay rights moved further and faster than anyone predicted. In April 2000, Governor Howard Dean signed a law making Vermont the first state to legalize same-sex civil unions – a symbolic compromise in nomenclature that was nevertheless the far boundary for liberal politicians position at this time. How did the country react, and how did politicians attempt to position themselves in light of this new development? Was the concept of “civil unions” simply a form of political cover to make their views appear more moderate? Did it make sense from a policy standpoint?

In November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ordered the state to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. While this was a victory for gay rights, it had consequences for the state’s junior Senator in his 2004 presidential run. As images of same-sex weddings began to appear prominently in newspapers across the country, a national debate raged over the proper definition of marriage in America. George Bush and Karl Rove deployed the development as a wedge issue to mobilize base voters in record numbers, one factor that allowed Bush to eke out a narrow victory in November. In this case, the policy decision of a single state had far-reaching implications for national politics.

While the 2008 presidential campaign largely avoided social issues, gay rights still figured prominently. California’s Proposition 8 proposed to amend the state’s constitution to reverse the recent state Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage. Arkansas considered a ballot initiative that would prohibit unmarried couples from adopting children, an obvious assault on gay and lesbian couples who were unable to marry. Both initiatives ultimately passed. How were Prop 8’s opponents and supporters organized and what strategies did they employ? How is a campaign for or against a ballot initiative different than a campaign for an individual? Did the “No on Prop 8” forces make tactical mistakes that led to their defeat?

The tide then seemed to turn decisively on gay rights and in particular gay marriage. For one thing, culture may be more powerful than politics. Despite the conventional wisdom about the 2004 election, were there cultural forces then – and are there cultural forces now – that work long-term against opposition to gay rights?
While it never became a central issue, President Obama did campaign against DOMA and DADT, but took no immediate action on them once in office. He stunned the LGBT community when the Justice Department wrote a legal brief defending DOMA and comparing gay relationships to incest. In the wake of these apparent affronts, prominent LGBT activists pulled out of a Democratic Party fundraiser, and then staged an “Equality March” on Washington. After that, the Administration reversed itself on DOMA’s constitutionality and refused to defend it in court. The Republican House responded by doing so — but top Republicans, including Romney, seemed to talk about the issue only when asked— and primarily to targeted constituencies. This was a sharp contrast with the Bush approach in 2004. What explains it?

In the 2010 lame duck session of Congress, the Obama Administration and the outgoing Democratic Congress finally secured the end of DADT so LGBT Americans now serve openly in the military. The delay until then reflected a strategy to bring the Pentagon along and make it politically possible for members of Congress to vote for a repeal because they could argue that the decision would be conditioned on the assent of the nation’s military leaders. Was delay a smart strategy? Could the President have initially issued a “stop-loss” order under which he would cite military strength and readiness as a reason to suspend the ban—or would that have reduced the chances of ultimately changing the law? Would moving earlier on gay rights have derailed the Administration’s higher priorities such as health care reform and financial reform?

Obama had to reenlist the gay and lesbian constituency and their supporters for 2012. How important was that in his decision to push for ending on DADT?

Equally surprising to many, the President announced that he favored marriage equality in the spring of 2012. This came after a federal district court — and then an appeals court — struck down California’s Proposition 8 and as legislation was passing in both New York and Maryland authorizing same-sex marriage. In both cases, the effort was driven by Democratic governors — Andrew Cuomo and Martin O’Malley — who have had their own national ambitions for 2016. Will any Democrat who hopes to be nominated for president in the future have to take a similar position? And could any Republican presidential candidate? In general elections, is there a political price to be paid for opposing marriage equality?

Obama’s shifting position probably reflected what seemed politically possible as events unfolded; there is evidence that he may have believed in marriage equality all along, but calculated that he couldn’t say so. In any case, his decision not only energized his base, but evidence quickly emerged that Obama’s endorsement reinforced the increasing trend in public opinion to accept same sex marriage. His position also appeared to reshape attitudes in the African-American community.

In June of 2013, the Supreme Court struck down DOMA and on procedural grounds reinstated a district court’s ruling that nullified Prop 8, thereby securing marriage equality in the nation’s largest state. On October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court refused to review circuit court rulings, based on the Court’s earlier decision in the DOMA case, granting a constitutional right to marriage equality, thereby extending the right to marry to portions of the nation that included 200 million people. The Court vastly expanded the reach of marriage equality without directly settling the constitutional question. Did the court have a political reason for achieving that result while attempting to duck the issue, at least temporarily?
After the Sixth Circuit broke with other circuits and ruled against same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court struck down all the remaining state laws prohibiting same sex marriage. We will discuss the subsequent political and policy fallout: the demand for religious liberty exemptions; the role of the issue in the 2016 Republican primaries and general election; the demand on the other side to expand LGBT civil rights protections, which lead the city of Houston to repudiate an equality ordinance which opponents attacked on the grounds that it would have permitted men claiming to be transgender women or dressed up as women to use the women’s restroom.

We will discuss the implications of the Trump victory for the future of LGBT rights, including marriage equality.

Whatever happens in the near term and the new administration, demography is likely to be destiny here – given that support for gay rights is strongest among the young and weakest among the old. But there is no question that the interplay of politics and policy, of culture and the “coming out” of relatives, friends and neighbors advanced this civil rights revolution at an unforeseen and perhaps unforeseeable pace.

Readings (subject to change/update):
Classes 7 and 8: Reagan, Romney, Trump and Social Issues

Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney said he was pro-choice when he ran for the Senate in 1994. He said it again in his 2002 gubernatorial campaign. But by 2006 Romney had moved to the right on abortion and stem cell research and, whatever the reason, the move was certainly essential to appealing to the Republican base in presidential primaries. Romney now said that in addition to being “personally pro-life,” he believed government should outlaw almost all abortions. From then, through 2008 and 2012, he seemed to move continually right on social issues, calling himself “severely conservative” and assailing Planned Parenthood to secure the 2012 nomination. This also left him vulnerable to charges of flip-flopping.

During his 1994 Senate race, Romney told the story of a family friend who had died during an illegal abortion, saying that it had convinced him to support abortion rights while continuing to personally oppose the procedure. He never carved out a clear position on the issue, resorting to a nuanced characterization of himself as personally “pro-life” but essentially “pro-choice” that was difficult for Massachusetts voters to credit. He continued to waffle on the issue depending on his audience, leading Ted Kennedy to charge in a debate that Romney wasn’t “pro-choice, but multiple choice.”

Returning to Massachusetts from the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake to run for governor in 2002, Romney once again characterized himself as a “pro-choice” moderate who personally held “pro-life” views. As he prepared a presidential candidacy for 2008, however, Romney moved sharply right on social issues. He claimed that a 2004 meeting with a stem cell researcher had brought him realize that life begins at conception. This sparked a fierce battle in 2005, which Romney lost in the Massachusetts legislature, to drastically limit stem cell research. He then vetoed a bill to expand access to emergency contraception, citing his pro-life position. In an editorial defending his veto, Romney claimed that he had a deal with the people of Massachusetts, pledging to maintain the status quo on abortion rights, but this did not bind him with respect to new issues in the same area. In large part, his politics had no real policy consequences: the overwhelmingly Democratic Massachusetts legislature could easily override Romney’s vetoes. Did the fact that he could only exercise a symbolic veto actually enable Romney’s tactics?

Romney’s changing position on abortion followed him throughout the 2008 primary campaign. His opponents cited it at every opportunity, using his policy shifts to argue that he was a candidate with no convictions, a man who would say or do anything for votes. In one debate, for
instance, John McCain derisively referred to Romney as “the candidate of change.” Romney struggled to define and defend his views over several debates, but his candidacy fell apart in the wake of early defeats that culminated in his Super Tuesday trouncing.

How did Romney’s political maneuvering affect his tenure as governor? How did it affect his presidential campaign? Was there any way for Romney to balance his position on these issues to satisfy both his Massachusetts constituents and the Republican base?

In his successful 2012 primary campaign, Romney was again challenged as a flip-flopper. He responded by reaffirming and accelerating his move to the right on social issues. How did this play in the general election? Romney tried to avoid discussing these issues other than in targeted communications to very conservative audiences, but the explosion over Indiana Senate candidate Richard Mourdock’s comments on rape brought the issue front and center in an election where Romney would ultimately suffer a gender gap of 11 percent.

In terms of the 2012 race, Romney felt he had held to his 2008 positions. He could not otherwise hope to be nominated. Indeed, while disclaiming one flip-flop too far – on health care – he had to come up with what many regard as a forced distinction between his plan and Obamacare. Initially, he saw the universal health coverage bill passed in Massachusetts in cooperation with Senator Ted Kennedy and a Democratic legislature as powerful proof of his leadership capacity. He defended it as a national model during the 2008 debate with John McCain. But when Romneycare became the model for Obamacare – the Obama campaign delighted in making the comparison – Romney once again had to move to placate the Republican base. Apparently deciding he could not afford another apparent shift, he drew a distinction where many failed to see much of a difference. He defended the bill he passed in Massachusetts, but repudiated it as a national model. The issue should be left to the states, he said, and on his first day as president he would grant waivers to all 50 states exempting them from the requirements of the Obama health reform.

If he had been elected, the political litmus tests he had to pass could have profoundly reshaped policy ranging from reproductive services to future scientific research to health coverage for Americans.

We will then contrast the Romney experience with Ronald Reagan's and Donald Trump’s. As Governor of California, Reagan signed what was arguably the most permissive abortion law in the nation. Was this an issue which, at the time, he didn't care that much about, given his stated view that government should interfere less with individual decisions? He had to face reelection shortly afterwards, in 1970; did that play any role in his assent to the law? Or was he, as he later argued, all but tricked into signing the bill? (He also asserted that he had a sense of "guilt" when he did it.)

Romney never took a step that had such a profound liberalizing impact in the area of social issues. Politically, however, Reagan never faced the same kind of skepticism from the religious right that Romney did. Why? On their face, were Reagan's explanations more convincing than Romney's? Reagan ran as a "pro-life" champion when he challenged Gerald Ford in 1976; the issue was a dividing line with Ford that helped Reagan attract socially conservative voters. He
reiterated his opposition to abortion in 1980, but his speeches and advertising generally shied away from forceful advocacy. Why were conservatives so ready to credit his position? What role did the rest of his record play in fending off any doubts? Would Reagan have as easy a road today – or would he face the same kind of political pressures GOP Presidential candidates do to constantly prove his bona fides?

While a Romney in the Oval Office all but undoubtedly would have had to deliver his "severely conservative" agenda on social issues, President Reagan failed to deliver much of anything on the issue of abortion; he even appointed Sandra Day O'Connor, who became the swing vote to protect a woman's right to choose, to the Supreme Court. He also failed to attend the annual right to life rallies in Washington. Although only a few blocks away in the White House, he simply sent a message. Yet on the religious right, he continued to be hailed as a pro-life paladin, while the issue never had a prominent place on his legislative agenda, or in his 1980 and 1984 presidential campaigns. Politically why was he able to pull this off? Did his relative reticence here in reality strengthen him politically? Would Romney have preferred to take the same course? And does Reagan's artful posture as president possibly shed light on his original decision as governor to sign the California law?

Finally, the contract with Donald Trump is striking. He shifted wholesale on social issues and seemed to pay no price for it in the primaries or in the general election, where he had the support of the religious right. Why? Even if Trump doesn't care about his newfound commitments here, does he have to keep them? Does he have to hold to his promise to appoint only conservative, Scalia-like Justices to the Supreme Court, and how could that affect questions like abortion and other social issues? If the President and the Court reverse recent trends on those issues, would he face the prospect of a backlash that could upend politics and policies that go far beyond social issues? Think of the reaction in North Carolina that ousted an otherwise popular Republican Governor in 2016 after he signed a law prohibiting municipal non-discrimination ordinance and limiting the rights of the transgender citizen. Is there any way for Trump to avoid being boxed in here?

**Required Readings:**

**Romney Readings**


**Reagan Readings:**
10. Excerpt from the “Transcript: Mitt Romney on 'FOX News Sunday’” Fox News, August 12, 2007 (Q + A on abortion)

Trump Readings
3. Emily Crockett, A Trump-Pence administration absolutely would "punish" women who have abortions, Vox, October 5, 2016

Classes 9 and 10: John V. Lindsay: Liberal Dream and Urban Realities

In November of 1965, the young and charismatic John V. Lindsay, a liberal Republican Congressman from Manhattan’s Upper East Side, was elected Mayor of New York City. His success was seen, and heralded, as a revolt against an old and exhausted political order. Indeed the campaign’s unofficial slogan, lifted from a column by Murray Kempton, was: “He’s fresh and everyone else is tired.” Lindsay’s run, his victory, and his Kennedyesque persona raised expectations that the city’s seemingly intractable decline could be reversed, and a “new” New York would be born.

The day he took office he squarely confronted political reality – a massive transit strike that paralyzed the city. He stood his ground – and walked to City Hall from Gracie Madison -- for days, but ultimately he had to concede most of the union’s demands. A generation later, Michael Bloomberg dealt more successfully, or at least pacifically, with municipal unions. Did he hold a stronger hand in terms of the perceptions of his power? Was Lindsay the WASP less well situated to confront a primarily ethnic union than if he had been named Kennedy, and not just resembled one?
This question applies with even greater force to what became a dominant issue during his mayoralty – the rising, at times potentially, explosive demands for racial equality and greater minority political power, participation, and city employment. As a policy matter, Lindsay’s efforts to integrate the police and fire departments were pioneering and launched a process that spanned the next decades. In his first year, he experienced a major political setback when voters, in a racially divisive outcome, overturned his proposal for a Civilian Review Board to crack down on police brutality. Later on, his commitment to give minority parents a say in local schools sparked a confrontation with teachers and much of the Jewish community and a school strike that lasted through the fall of 1968.

One undeniable, almost singular achievement came during the urban riots that swept America in 1967 and 1968, peaking after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. New York was largely spared because Lindsay was able to walk the streets of predominantly African-American areas and stem the tides of violence. Was this the unintended payoff of his progressive policies on race? Whatever the political price, was Lindsay right on the merits of his policies – and successful in a way he did not anticipate in advance? At the same time, could he have done a better job of selling the policies – or did his charisma and star power spark resentment and resistance rather than assent?

Lindsay’s popularity was on the rise just as Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated. Lindsay almost certainly could have had the Senate appointment if he had asked New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller for it. Why didn’t he? What about his concern for the “unfinished job” in the city – and did his staff have a disincentive for Lindsay taking the appointment? Ironically, if Kennedy had lived and been nominated by the Democrats, Richard Nixon who toyed with the idea, might have felt compelled to turn to Lindsay as his running mate. But with Kennedy gone, Nixon who was moving to a “southern strategy,” feared that choosing Lindsay would alienate white voters in the south.

That fall came the teacher’s strike which pitted African-Americans against the predominantly Jewish members of the teachers union. The winter brought a massive snowstorm leaving paralyzing drifts that the city was unable to clear for days in the outer boroughs. Lindsay’s political prospects looked bleak.

As he prepared to run for reelection in 1969, circumstances – and probably principled conviction too – pushed him into more overt opposition to the Nixon Administration and an unbridled advocacy of progressive policies. He lost the Republican nomination and had to survive as a third-party candidate. But to compete at all he had to engage in a preemptive campaign of apology, explaining the “mistake” of not foreseeing the snowstorm – it was a carefully couched admission – and the “mistakes we all made” during the school strike. After that attempt to tamp down popular anger, he had an opening and could once again get a hearing from voters.

One issue Lindsay would not compromise on was race. He had been an early advocate of civil rights as a Congressman and as Vice Chairman of the Kerner Commission, appointed by President Johnson to assess the riots. Lindsay and his aides drafted and insisted on the Commission’s landmark verdict – that America was “moving toward two societies, one white, one black, separate and unequal.” The liberal without a party achieved solid minority backing against a conservative Democratic nominee and an even more conservative Republican. He also
had the support of most of the public sector unions. How did this happen after his confrontations with transit workers, sanitation workers, and teachers?

The other powerful issue he advanced to attract progressive Democrats was his all-out opposition to the Vietnam War. How did he turn this into a municipal concern even as his outspokenness increasingly made him a national liberal leader? After his reelection in a three-candidate field with just over 40 percent of the vote, Lindsay also became one of the first officeholders to call for amnesty for those who had resisted the draft during Vietnam. When he proclaimed a day of mourning for students shot by National Guard units during protests at Kent State and Jackson State Universities, waves of largely ethnic hardhats marched in protest on City Hall. Lindsay was now a vivid presence in America’s two great national struggles – over the war and civil rights.

At the same time, with the economy turning down and threatening the municipal budget, he looked beyond a purely municipal solution and became the spearhead of both a state coalition of mayors and a national urban coalition demanding more help for cities from the state and federal governments. Here too he became mayor as leader – not just for cities, but for a larger cause. Facing an increasing budget challenge, was it the right politics – or the right policy – to function as “America’s Mayor” – a title he held long before Rudolph Giuliani?

Lindsay gradually moved toward a final break with the Republican Party. He refused to endorse Nelson Rockefeller for reelection in 1970. In a speech just before that midterm election, he denounced the Nixon-Agnew tactics of “fear and smear.” Nonetheless he still clung to the GOP. If he had switched parties then, would he have been a more credible Presidential candidate a year later. Why didn’t he? Was it a matter of policy and principle – or simply a result of political miscalculation?

In 1971, he was criticized as opportunistic when he finally switched parties and shortly afterwards entered the Democratic presidential primaries. Did this national run have real consequences in terms of municipal budget policy? (Not long after he left office, New York City would have to go into virtual receivership.) Did his presidential run make it harder to cut back spending and more tempting to paper over the city’s budgetary difficulties?

Lindsay’s mastery of television and his successful efforts to strengthen the Broadway theater and bring more filmmaking to the city were heralded at the time. But did they also have contributed to the political backlash against him? On the other hand, if he hadn’t been so television savvy, would he ever have been mayor in the first place?

We will assess Lindsay’s claimed achievements like saving the city even amid racial tensions he never managed to end; his integration of uniformed services and the city bureaucracy; his pioneering leadership on the environment—his investment in parks and his role in the very first Earth Day; his proclamation after the Stonewall riots of non-discrimination against gays in city hiring; his hardly remembered reorganization of government and creation of municipal superagencies that are still the backbone of city government today (why didn’t this policy help his politics?); and his experiments in deploying waves of police into high crime neighborhoods, a forerunner of community policing. But even as he established that policy, crime rates soared. What role did his insistence on accurate crime statistics play – and was that insistence politically
smart? Finally, Lindsay had to deal with a massive corruption scandal in the police department. Was he in a position to launch a tough crackdown?

It has been suggested that as a political figure Lindsay suffered from a tragedy of timing. If he had left as mayor to go to the Senate in 1968, he would probably have been a major force in national policy for decades to come. If he had become a Democrat in 1971, he rather than George McGovern could conceivably have been the antiwar candidate in 1972. After he left office the fiscal crisis hit – and Lindsay was blamed for it. Is that fair? Are neo-Conservatives right that he proves the inevitable failure of a liberal hope which they dismiss as hubris?

Readings:
- Sam Roberts, America’s Mayor: John V. Lindsay and the Reinvention of New York

Classes 11 and 12 The Virginia & California Car Tax Battles

For decades, Virginia relied on an annual excise tax on the value of automobiles as a major source of revenue. The gubernatorial campaign of Democratic candidate Don Beyer first identified the building backlash against the car tax in focus groups in early 1997. But Democratic legislative leaders and policy experts strongly opposed repealing or reducing the car tax on the grounds that this was unaffordable and irresponsible. So Beyer continued to focus on what he assumed from the start would be his centerpiece issue – investment in education. But the Republicans, whose candidate Jim Gilmore appeared weak, conducted their own focus groups, eventually found the car tax issue, concentrated almost exclusively on a promise to repeal it, and handily won the election. Fiscal issues were rendered irrelevant by politics. The aftermath eventually brought fiscal crisis and tax increases under a subsequent Democratic governor – the car tax still is in place – albeit in modified form.

In the process, the political landscape in Virginia was transformed. Virginia, once a reliably Republican state, elected Democrats to the Senate in 2006, 2008, and 2014 – and voted for Obama in two successive presidential elections. Mark Warner’s landslide victory over Gilmore in the 2008 Senate race attests to the far-reaching political ramifications of the car tax battle. In 2010, Republicans recovered in the statewide election, fueled by the midterm dissatisfaction with the condition of the economy. And they failed, by narrow margins, to win back the governorship in 2013 and to defeat Warner for re-election even in the very Republican midterm of 2014.

As a policy adviser if you were concerned with policy, as Beyer was, how would you weigh the merits of such an issue against the political considerations? Is there a natural temptation to discount the political risks? Was there a third way to deal with the issue – for example, to replace the car tax with a more progressive, or at least different, form of revenue? What is the role of a political/candidate in such a situation – simply to push the policy arguments or accommodate to the wider context? In a situation where policy and politics are fundamentally at odds, is it more important to be right than to be governor? Did Gilmore and the Republican party ultimately pay a steep political price for a promise he couldn’t keep – with major policy consequences both statewide and nationally?
We will then compare the Virginia experience with the political pressures and consequences of proposing to cut the car tax in California six years later. Arnold Schwarzenegger called for car tax cut during the recall campaign that ended with him replacing Gray Davis as Governor of the state. He signed the cut the day he took the oath of office. The fiscal effects were similar to those in Virginia, but the politics played out in ways that were initially dissimilar - and then ultimately similar.

Was the car tax as central an issue in the California recall as it had been in Virginia in 1997? Could voters blame something other than cutting it for the state's deficits? Did Schwarzenegger pay a political price as Gilmore did? Following the "great recession," California's finances were even more deeply imperiled. So while the state's partisan complexion is almost immovably set – Schwarzenegger was a Republican exception - the episode did change the political culture in California, a state that had long resisted tax increases. How did a new governor, Jerry Brown, address the mounting fiscal problems? Did he take his own version of the path adopted by Governor Warner in Virginia? Was his move politically risky? And why did he make his move in 2012? How did that 2012 tax initiative shape California's 2014 statewide elections and how will it shape 2018?

Readings (subject to change):
VA Car Tax

CA Car Tax


10. “10 years later, lasting effects of car tax clash,” *News10 ABC*, June 20, 2013. [http://on.news10.net/1mr3NPf](http://on.news10.net/1mr3NPf)

**Classes 13 and 14: From Clintoncare to Welfare Reform to (the End?) Obamacare**

After she defended Bill Clinton against charges of infidelity in the 1992 campaign, and given her own record of policy involvement and advocacy, it was no surprise that Hillary Clinton was put in charge of developing the Clinton Administration’s health care reform proposal. One bill already before the Senate had wide support, but it called for employer mandates requiring companies to provide health coverage for their workers. President Clinton wanted to avoid that issue. During the campaign, he had outlined principles, but no specific plan. The policy process set up by Hillary Clinton was criticized as cumbersome and complicated and so was the bill that emerged from it. Why did candidate Clinton shy away from employer mandates? Did he lose the battle almost before it began by waiting months instead of making an existing Senate proposal an immediate priority, given that history indicates that new presidents almost always succeed in passing their first major proposal? Did the need to cut the deficit work against such a strategy? What was wrong – and what was right – with the process led by Hillary Clinton and the bill that resulted from it? What was the effect of the well-financed advertising campaign against the Clinton proposal and could the Administration have more effectively countered it? (The campaign essentially led people to believe that in return for a speculative gain, they might lose what they already had – the same problem that undid the 2005 Bush Social Security proposal.)
Even as it became clear in the late spring and summer of 1994 that the Clinton plan could not pass in its existing form, the Administration refused to compromise. Republicans like Senator Bob Dole and Senator John Chafee retreated from their own compromise offers as the President appeared increasingly bound to lose the battle. Should President Clinton have compromised early on – when and to what degree? When should the presumed superiority of a policy yield to political reality? When is half a loaf better than none?

After the stunning Democratic defeat in the 1994 midterm elections, national health reform was abandoned in favor of an incremental strategy to improve the availability of health care. With a new and far more conservative Congress riding high, the unintended consequence of the health care battle, its political fallout, was that welfare reform became a central issue. Fearful about his 1996 re-election, at the advice of his pollster Dick Morris, and after initially vetoing a welfare proposal that went well beyond his original reform position, President Clinton signed exactly that kind of restrictive bill. Was it a mistake not to propose welfare reform earlier when he had a Democratic Congress? To what extent did political pressures override sound policy in Clinton’s decision to approve the welfare bill?

What is the best way, in terms of timing and compromise to pass a major new initiative? Did the demands of the 1992 campaign, in which Bill Clinton did not initially advance health care plan, actually push him into a position that hobbled his entire first term?

Health care reemerged as a signature issue in the 2008 presidential campaign. Hillary Clinton tried to trumpet her work on the issue to bolster her theme of “experience.” The other campaigns shot back, implying that experience with a failed reform attempt was no qualification. To what extent did Clinton’s history in the health care debate help her 2008 campaign, and how much did memories of failure hurt her?

As the Democratic primaries engaged, Obama and Clinton debated their health care plans. In debates and public statements Clinton repeatedly highlighted the key difference between her plan and her opponent’s – the individual mandate. She said it was essential to provide truly universal health care; he claimed that such a mandate eliminated real choice, arguing that most people would choose to purchase health coverage once costs were lowered, as his plan proposed to do. It is unclear whether voters ultimately cared about or even understood this difference between the two candidates’ plans, but it remained a prominent issue until the end in a primary fight in which the candidates actually agreed on most policies. In the general election, John McCain took a different approach in attacking Obama’s health care plan. He argued that it would strip away choice, give more power to bureaucrats, and lead to socialized medicine in the United States. However, these attacks lacked saliency with an electorate all but panicked about the economy. Exit polls in November showed that voters who said they were worried about health care voted overwhelmingly for Obama.

How did the politics of the nominating contest lock Obama into an early move to enact health reform? Did the Clinton history influence the way he handled the legislation? After the Clinton failure – with the White House drafting the entire bill and presenting it to Congress – Obama decided to give Congress the latitude to craft the legislation, which resulted in a number of competing proposals. Did he read the history correctly or was his forbearance a mistake? Should he have been more active earlier – or was it more effective for him to use his influence in the
final stages of the fight? As for the Republicans, was it smart politics – to ride the wave of tea party discontent and take up charges like “death panels” and “socialized medicine?”

In the midst of the Tea Party uproar and Scott Brown’s victory in the special election for Ted Kennedy’s senate seat, the President’s Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel argued vigorously that Obama should settle for a scaled-down bill; indeed, most of his advisors had wanted him to postpone health reform until later in his presidency. This minimalist approach was nicknamed “the Titanic” – women and children first. Obama, prodded by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, insisted on moving full-speed ahead. Health reform ultimately then passed by the narrowest of margins, without Republican support. Why did the President insist on moving so quickly? Was he drawing on the lessons not just of the Clinton failure, but of the Reagan success on tax cuts in 1981?

How did the battle shape the politics of 2010, when Democrats lost the House; of 2012 when President Obama was reelected; and of 2014 when the GOP finally won the Senate?

In 2013, Republicans shut down the federal government in their effort to repeal the Affordable Care Act. They seemed to face a political backlash that might alter the usual patterns of a midterm election. Then, as implementation took center stage, the Obamacare website became an online fiasco, a metaphor for an Administration and a government that apparently wasn’t up to the job. Democratic Senator Charles Schumer of New York argued after the 2014 midterms that moving early on health reform was a political disaster for Democrats: it distracted from economic issues and alienated otherwise Democratically-inclined middle class voters. Is this accurate analysis? If they had known the political fallout, should Obama and Pelosi have put off reform? Would that have effectively killed it? And could they justify denying coverage to millions, and degrading insurance coverage for everyone, for the sake of partisan advantage?

What role did the debate over health reform play in 2016? What are the competing political pressures on President Trump, who promised to repeal and replace Obamacare? How do policy realities constrain Trump’s and the Republican Congress’s choices? And is there an existing policy mechanism, reconciliation, that facilitates and complicates both policy and politics here?

Readings (subject to change):
1. State of the Union Address, President Bill Clinton, Jan. 25, 1994, excerpts.
2. George Stephanopoulos. All Too Human, pp. 297-302.
5. State of the Union Address, President Bill Clinton, Jan. 23, 1996, excerpts.
Immigration policy in America has been driven by politics ever since restrictive measures began to be imposed. Early controversies – and restrictions – centered on the Japanese and Chinese
immigrants, who helped to build the transcontinental railroad. In the wake of World War I, Congress and the country were prepared to clampdown on what had long been a free flow of immigrants. How did the "Red Scare" that followed the war play into this? What about the role of new "science" of eugenics? It had the trappings of a policy argument, but is that what made it so effective? And where did the labor movement stand on the issue of immigration and why? What about powerful Southern members of Congress? Was the mood of the country then similar to the anti-immigrant mood that prevails among a deeply convinced minority of Americans today? What was the underlying fear?

The 1924 act set rigid national origin quotas designed to keep America, as its sponsors said, truly American – not very different from the country of 1790 or 1890 in terms of its racial and ethnic composition. In effect, the act discriminated against southern Europeans and Catholics, largely excluded Asians, and had an unintended or at least unforeseen consequence during the Holocaust.

After the war, the United States accepted an increasing number of refugees. But the quota system remained until the first major challenge came from Senator and then President John F. Kennedy, who wrote about and then proposed major immigration reforms to end national origin as the governing metric for immigration. Did his initiative reflect the changing nature of the electorate? Hispanics still constituted a very small percentage of the American population. But there were other ethnic groups, increasingly powerful in the electoral process, who had a stake in the outcome.

The Kennedy reform was led into law in 1965 by his brother, Senator Edward Kennedy. But that was the beginning, not the end of the battle over immigration reform and the backlash it has stirred over the past half century. In 1986, President Reagan, Senator Kennedy, and a coalition of Democrats and Republicans passed "amnesty" for millions of undocumented immigrants, the vast majority of them Hispanics, who had crossed the border and joined other Hispanics already legally here, many as full–fledged citizens. What was the political impetus to this change? How did Ronald Reagan fare with Hispanic voters? And where were they concentrated? Could they make a difference in a close election?

The most consequential backlash came in California, where there was a growing concentration of Hispanic voters. In 1994, Governor Pete Wilson, facing a tough reelection battle against Kathleen Brown, the daughter of one former governor and the sister of another, sponsored Proposition 187 to deny basic health services and education to undocumented immigrants and their families. It was the heart of Wilson's campaign and he won. Although the proposition was soon declared unconstitutional, it would have profound political consequences for the state of California and for presidential politics. We will examine how and why it upended both the presumed "Republican lock" on the electoral college and the balance of political power in the nation's largest state.

As a governor and as President, George W. Bush took a very different approach to Hispanic voters. He reached out to them in his 2004 reelection. What difference did they make then? What course did he choose afterwards given that the 1986 act had not, as promised, resolved the problem of undocumented immigrants? There were more of them in the first decade of the 21st century than there were in 1986. So in 2006 and 2007, Bush worked with Arizona Senator John
McCain and Ted Kennedy to craft a new version of comprehensive immigration reform which provided a path to citizenship. Why did traditional Democratic allies, like the labor movement, shift from opposition to support? What was the political reality that apparently argued for reform from a Republican perspective? And what was the political reality that doomed the bill- and led John McCain to abandon the effort? How did that work out in the 2008 general election?

By 2010, McCain would renounce immigration reform – and in his own reelection battle for the Senate, broadcast a spot demanding that the government build the "danged" fence along the Mexican border. As Democrats pressed for action, even if President Obama acted timidly at first, what price did Mitt Romney have to pay in Republican primaries in order to secure his presidential nomination? How did the rise of the Tea Party affect the composition of the GOP electorate and its attitudes toward immigration? How did Obama move to exploit the situation? What happened to the Hispanic vote in 2012? And why were other groups, like Asians, similarly impacted by the anti-immigration reform stance of the Republican Party?

In 2014, President Obama delayed his promised executive action on immigration, supposedly to help beleaguered Democratic Senate candidates in states like North Carolina, Arkansas and Louisiana. Was this a mistake? Could the delay actually have cost Democrats a Senate seat or two? Following the midterms, Obama issued an executive order which allowed millions of undocumented immigrants to remain and work in the US legally. The Republican leadership in Congress assailed the President in angry terms and sued, at least temporarily blocking the order.

A number of Republicans in , including Florida Senator Marco Rubio and McCain, who was back from his excursion to the border, had worked with Democrats to craft a comprehensive bill, which passed the Senate with a minority of Republicans voting for it and then stalled in the House.

And what was the fallout for Rubio and his presidential ambitions? How did he react? Republicans Presidential candidates generally ran hard against immigration reform and often expressed their opposition in very sharp rhetoric. Did Donald Trump drive the GOP in this direction, and what was the impact in 2016?

In terms of the Republican Party does the nature of the nominating process and congressional reapportionment not only enable, but almost compel an anti-reform posture?

Are we reaching a moment similar to the civil rights battles under Kennedy and Johnson, which solidified African-Americans as a nearly unanimous and permanent Democratic constituency? Could we see the same phenomenon with Hispanics and other immigrant groups? Trump nonetheless won the presidency despite, or in part because of, his hardline stance. How did that happen and is the ability to win with relatively few Hispanic minority votes a 2016 phenomenon or one that can be replicated in future elections?

Now President Trump has the chance to reverse the immigration policies that so recently seemed ascendant in political terms. He promised a wall and a deportation force, but modulated his positions after his victory. What political constraints, if any, does he face as he moves in this new direction? And are there policy barriers to the changes he could institute or seek?
We will also discuss how the controversy over Syrian refugees illuminates traditional American attitudes toward immigrants and how this could play out in the Trump years. Could there be a Muslim ban—and are there policy barriers that militate against it.

Readings (subject to change):

1. John F. Kennedy, *A Nation of Immigrants*, excerpts
6. super-economy.blogspot.com, Tino Sanandaji, “Why Hispanics are Natural Democrats and what the GOP can do about it”, Nov 12, 2012
7. 1965 Bill
8. 1986 Bill
   a. Adam Clymer, Edward Kennedy p. 405 , 478 – 479
   b. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, p.434
13. Karl Rove, “Immigration Reform and the Hispanic Vote,” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2013 (Also found on Rove’s website – rove.com; WSJ may have paywall)
   Susan Page
22. NYT Stories on Obama’s executive order, Nov. 21, 2014
   a. “Obama Daring Congress, acts to overhaul immigration”
   b. “Boehner says Obama’s immigration Action Damages Presidency”
   c. Some in GOP Fear That Hardliners Will Alienate Latino Voters
23. WashingtonPost.com, Greg Sargent, “GOP pollster warns his party: Learn to lead on
   immigration, or you’re courting irrelevance”, Feb. 27, 2015
   Record Minority Support To Win In 2016”, Feb. 24, 2015
25. Julia Preston and Jennifer Medina, Immigrants Who Came to U.S. as Children Fear
26. Martin Kaste, Trump Vows To End ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ But No One Can Agree What That
   Label Means, NPR, November 19, 2016. kuow.org/post/trump-vows-end-sanctuary-cities-
   no-one-can-agree-what-label-means

Classes 17 and 18: The “Vietnamization” Of American Politics

Vietnamization was the policy that unsuccessfully sought to extricate America from the war in
Vietnam without losing to the Communist regime in Hanoi. But the term has another
application: over the last half century and more, we have witnessed the Vietnamization of
American politics, as the origins, conduct, outcome and reactions to that conflict have often
decisively influenced a politics which in turn has shaped and limited our foreign policy.

American involvement in Vietnam was itself rooted in post- World War II and Cold War
politics. Franklin Roosevelt was determined not to support French colonialism in Vietnam. He
was opposed by many members of his own Administration, who persuaded his successor Harry
Truman to reverse course. America’s initial commitment seemed modest, but soon acquired
urgency in the fierce political recriminations that followed the "loss" of China and the fears about
Communist espionage in the United States.

Why did President Eisenhower resist American involvement as the French were being defeated
in Vietnam, but then commit the nation to back the newly created state of South Vietnam? Was
there any apparently viable political alternative – for Democrats as well as Republicans? We will
examine how Democrats were, or felt they were, disabled from virtually any dissent in the
aftermath of the Truman Administration's blame both for the fall of China and the stalemate in
the Korean War. In the presidential debates of 1960, John F. Kennedy was accused of being
"soft" on Communism when he suggested that the United States should not go to war with China
over two obscure islands, Quemoy and Matsu, controlled by the Nationalist government in
Taiwan. How did Kennedy react – and why?

Is there evidence that his real attitude toward China and Southeast Asia may have been different
from his public posture and prevailing American policy? President Eisenhower, who had coined
the term "domino theory," urged Kennedy in the days before his inauguration to consider armed
intervention in Laos. Instead he negotiated a compromise that left Laos, at least for a time, with a coalition government. How did he make this politically acceptable? Why did he consider but postpone a possible attempt at detente with China? Was it politically thinkable at the time?

Similarly, is it probable or possible that Kennedy contemplated de-escalation in Vietnam? After sending more advisers there, he ordered the withdrawal of 1000 of them before his trip to Dallas in November, 1963. But could he be open about his intentions, if indeed he intended to withdraw, or could he take decisive steps in that direction before the 1964 election? How did his successor Lyndon Johnson deploy the issue of war and peace in that election against Barry Goldwater? As Goldwater assailed him for not seeking victory in the Cold War and specifically in Vietnam, Johnson said during the campaign that: "American boys should not be sent to do the fighting for Asian boys." For Johnson what was the political impact and utility of the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which would become the basis for increasing American troops deployments after the election?

Why did Johnson take a different course then Kennedy might have? In the event, his decision triggered a cascade of political consequences: a successful challenge to his own renomination in 1968, the candidacy and then the death of Robert Kennedy, and a riven Democratic National Convention, which, in a nod to the antiwar forces, agreed to consider rewriting the rules of the presidential nominating process. Born of the Vietnam experience and its political fallout, this would lead to a revolution in the way both parties nominate their Presidential candidates. (Without the change, there almost certainly would not be a President Trump.)

How did Vietnam play out as an issue in the 1968 general election? What was Richard Nixon's political concern about the prospect of peace talks – and how did he handle it? After taking office, he continued the war and expanded it to Cambodia while also gradually drawing down the US troop commitment. Nixon's apparent resolve to protract American involvement sparked massive protests, especially on college campuses. How did Nixon react politically? And what was his other response, both to the protesters and to the possible candidacy of Edward Kennedy? That response had its own transformative political impact, culminating in the Watergate scandal and the destruction of the Nixon presidency.

Meanwhile, in 1972, the Vietnam war played a decisive part in the nomination of George McGovern as the Democratic candidate for president. After he lost 49 states, what did Democrats conclude about the nature of his campaign? What lessons did they draw for the future? But why then did McGovern's position on the war ultimately prevail, as Congress refused to let Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford, try to save the South Vietnamese regime on the eve of the fall of Saigon?

The Vietnam experience, including the Watergate scandal it seeded, has reverberated through American politics ever since. How did it open the way to the election of Jimmy Carter? How did the Iran hostage crisis resonate with public attitudes post – Vietnam, and enable the election of a presumably hawkish Ronald Reagan just five years after the war? What test did Reagan have to pass in order to get elected? What did political pressures compel him to do as President after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, with a massive loss of American life? How did his nearly simultaneous invasion of Grenada fit the now Vietnamized politics of the United States?
The first President Bush went to war after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. He even cited Vietnam in his nationally televised address about that conflict. What did he say and why—and then more important, what did he do that reflected the lessons of that earlier war? And how did those lessons, and the politics that embedded them in public opinion, inform Bill Clinton's decisions to withdraw from Somalia after a Marine helicopter was shot down, to avoid intervention in Rwanda during the genocide, and to wage an air war in the Balkans during his second term?

Most Democrats, although not Clinton or Al Gore, had opposed the first Gulf War. Many of them even invoked the specter of Vietnam. Then, after 9/11, why did so many of them support the second Bush's war in Iraq? Did shock of 9/11 abate the political resistance to a large-scale intervention of US troops abroad—and (temporarily) reverse public attitudes shaped by Vietnam? Did potential Democratic presidential candidates assume that politically they had to agree to the invasion of Iraq? How did they handle the issue as the campaign went on—and how did Vietnam itself echo in the election of 2004?

As they opposed Iraq, did Democrats have to find a war to be for? How did Afghanistan become the good war—for the Democratic nominee in 2004, and then in 2008? But at the same time, as disillusionment with Iraq increasingly took hold, did our politics return to its previously Vietnamized state? In 2008, who won the argument, both in the Democratic primaries and in the general election, about withdrawal from Iraq? And by 2012, what was Barack Obama saying about the future of the American presence in Afghanistan? Why then did Obama decide to extend the American combat role in Afghanistan?

After the rise of ISIL in Iraq and Syria, an Obama Administration forced to reengage initially relied on airpower. Whether right on the merits or not, does this accord with domestic public opinion, especially in light of recent attacks? How did this play out in the 2016 campaign, and how will it play out in the Trump administration?

There have been breaks in the Vietnamization of our politics and therefore our foreign policy. So far, though, a conflict in which America was first involved over 60 years ago constantly reasserts itself as a powerful driver of public opinion, a determinant of political options and policy choices.

Required Readings:
3. David Talbot, Brothers, pp.214 – 229
4. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy, pp.204 – 205
9. Lou Cannon, President Reagan, pp.80 – 81, 384 – 401

(Note: the prompts for the team presentations that follow are intended to be suggestive not comprehensive. Please feel free to consider other policy and political challenges and opportunities as you formulate your presentation.)

Classes 19 and 20: Stormy Weather: the Politics of Energy Policy and Climate Change* Presentations

Energy and Climate Policy endured legislative stalemate for years, even as the discovery of new Fossil Fuel resources and major changes such as increases in domestic production in oil and natural gas altered the energy economy, driving coal mining for instance toward extinction. On the climate front, President Obama negotiated a far-reaching bilateral agreement with China and signed the Paris Climate Accord as an executive agreement, not a treaty.

In the 2012 election, Mitt Romney felt compelled to move from saying that climate change was real to suggesting that we don’t know how much of it is man-made and can be addressed through carbon emission reduction. In 2016, global warming was derided by President Trump as “a Chinese hoax designed to hobble the American economy.”

Taking account of the new President’s personnel and policy decisions so far—for example, Obama executive orders challenged and stymied in court, which Trump can revoke and the Paris
Accord, from which he can withdraw—recommend future policies, and a political strategy to achieve them. You can do so from either a skeptical or a convinced view on climate change.

If you operate from a skeptical perspective, take account of the potential political consequences in 2018 and 2020. Can the Trump promise to “bring back coal” be kept, particularly as the Administration approves additional drilling and hydraulic fracturing, which can accelerate the decline of coal?

Will Republican candidates prevail in these states in any event, or is there a risk of backlash in places like Ohio and Pennsylvania if the promise proves to be empty? Is there a policy fix that can stimulate coal production, at least initially? Beyond this can free reign for fossil fuel production across the spectrum generate jobs and economic growth that will pay political dividends in coming elections? What will happen under this scenario to the growing sector of alternative energy, with what if any political consequences? More broadly, assess the long term policy and political consequences if your skepticism turns out to be wrong. Or make the case that the long term doesn’t matter, at least politically.

If you operate from the conviction that climate change is real, how can you deal with an Administration and a Congress that seem utterly hostile to the idea? Is there any basis for compromise? Can new technology mitigate the carbon impact of increased fossil fuel production? Can opposition to the Administration’s course, alongside an alternative policy, become an effective political appeal in the mid-term or in the next presidential election, especially in turning out millennial and college-educated voters and in potentially vulnerable costal states like Florida, where Democratic Senator Bill Nelson is up for re-election in 2018?
And what are the possibilities for action at the state and local level? Can governments there stop or imped fracking? Could a state like California raise mileage standards for vehicles and alter at least that aspect of national policy? What other steps could be taken independent of Washington? How much difference would any of this make in terms of rising temperatures on state and local politics?

**Classes 21 and 22: Policing the Police: Policy Options and Political Viability Presentations**

Police shootings and alleged misconduct have become controversial and politically contentious. Assess the dimensions of the problem and develop recommendations for oversight and specific change -- or make a case that this is neither desirable nor politically practical. What are the respective roles of federal, state and local governments? How can advocates of reform deal with likely resistance from the Trump Administration and Attorney General Sessions. To what extent can they block change, how can its advocates counter their opposition, and to what degree can the clash motivate African American and Hispanic voters? Analyze the impact of Black Lives Matter and the risk of a growing backlash. In short, deal with the racial implications of the issue. How do they frustrate or facilitate a solution?

Can technology like body cameras offer an answer? Or can police departments, local politics, and even juries nullify their utility?
Focus on the political viability of your proposed policy. For example, how would you make your case to voters in a local election when oversight becomes a driving issue? Remember how Mayor John Lindsay was politically upended in his first year in office when he set up a Civilian Review Board to deal with allegations of police misconduct. How has the political climate changed since then, remained the same, or suddenly become more hostile to reform? And if you are proposing additional oversight, respond to the contention of police and other opponents that this will increase violent crime.

Classes 23 and 24: Prop 13, California’s Fiscal Challenges, and Jerry Brown’s Final Term*

Presentations

Recommend and analyze the political viability of major fiscal initiatives, both during Governor Jerry Brown’s remaining time in office and for the candidates seeking to succeed him in 2018. How will the demands of the 2018 campaign limit the next Governor’s capacity to act? Can a Democratic Governor act decisively to secure California's fiscal future, even as his own party in the legislature is pressing hard to spend more and more? Can a candidate or Democratic Governor take on the issue of public employee pension reform – and how can he/she counter the political influence of the unions, which are bedrock supporters and funders of the Democratic Party? Do the tax increases Brown passed in 2012 now extended indefinitely by initiative in 2016, create more fiscal breathing room, or will they simply be used as a way to avoid more fundamental challenges? How does California as a high tax state compete effectively for business growth and jobs? The state set a national pace in job creation in recent years, but is there a breaking point?

Can fiscal issues open a path to viability or even victory for a Republican nominee for Governor? Make the case for cutting state taxes – and assess the policy and political impacts of doing so.

In either case, consider the politics of issues like the bullet train, criminal justice reform, and tuition increases in the state university system. In addition, consider whether there is any prospect for repealing or modifying Proposition 13. Take account of the political arguments that would dominate any such campaign: for example, from one side, the contention that Prop 13 constitutes a vast windfall for large corporations, mostly unnoticed and unintended by the voters who passed the proposition in 1978; from the other side, the warning that changing the property tax treatment of commercial property would drive businesses and jobs out of the state. Set out a program and a strategy to secure change or recommend against it. What can be achieved – and what is literally impossible?

Classes 25 and 26: Trade Policy and Trade Politics in the Trump/Sanders Era*

Presentations

Both President Trump and Senator Bernie Sanders made trade a central part of their 2016 messages—and the issue helped Trump breach the blue wall of traditionally Democratic rust belt states. How did we reach the point where trade proved to be such a decisive issue? Were agreements for freer trade the cause of massive job losses—or a scapegoat?
With that as background, and taking account of decisions the new Administration has already made, propose a policy and political strategy to advance, modify, or reverse the trend toward fewer trade barriers in a globalized world. Take account of the following questions. How can the President, if he wishes, back off his harder line promises by “re-negotiating” rather than discarding existing trade agreements? And how would that impact his voter base? How does he balance his blue state, blue collar, base with other Republican bases of business, the US Chamber of Commerce, and more traditional conservatives? Can a tougher stance on trade bring back older line manufacturing jobs—and what will be the political reaction if it doesn’t? Has the GOP now become a protectionist party? Can Democrats, who in their Clintonian incarnation in the 1990s negotiated NAFTA, politically afford any course but skepticism toward free trade? How will this issue, once thought settled in favor of trade agreements, play out in 2018 and 2020? And if the United States pursues a more protectionist course across the board, examine the risks of: trade wars, rising consumer prices, and the resulting political impact.

Recommend any policy approach you prefer, but make the case for its political viability both short and long term.

**Class 27: Trump and the GOP— Beyond the First Hundred Days***

Presentation

What next after President Trump’s First Hundred Days? Recommend a way forward on issues of your choosing to the administration. Explain the interrelated policy and political consequences. How will your recommendations shape the 2018 midterm election and a potential Trump re-election bid? And how will they reshape policy and the political balance of power for the long-term period? Discuss whether the Administration should focus on short or longer-term purposes. Can or should Trump build any bridges to Democrats or should he ignore them? And if the Administration does that, how can it respond to Democratic opposition?

**Class 28: Democratic Priorities, Democratic strategy, and a Looming midterm Election***

Presentation

Develop a policy and political strategy for a demoralized Democratic Party which now controls none of the three branches of government and which can’t stop massive legislative change except with a senate filibuster, assuming that procedural option survives. With attention to the 2018 midterm election, when Democrats have 25 Senate Seats to defend and Republicans only 8, recommend where Democrats should advance their own agenda, even if it can’t pass, and where they should pick pitched battles with President Trump and the GOP. For example, what if the Administration accepts the Ryan budget with its cuts in Medicaid, Medicare privatization, and its changes in Social Security? How can Democrats keep the controversy alive even if that budget passes? Can they use proposals like the minimum wage and equal pay for women to draw a contrast with the Trump/GOP tax cuts weighted toward the wealthy? How can they leverage social issues and the struggle over the Supreme Court to their advantage? Develop a thematic framework that can help Democrats both to recapture blue collar Democratic voters they lost in 2016, and to mobilize millennial and minorities who are less likely to vote in midterm elections. Finally, are there areas like infrastructure where both sides should work together, especially
because so many Democratic Senators up next year come from red states? And how does that fit with the rest of the strategy that you are recommending?
Suggested Policy Memos for the Midterm (Alternative topics of your own choosing are acceptable if approved by Professor Shrum or Kevin Baron)

1. Outline a program for a major new investment in infrastructure on the scale of the Eisenhower interstate highway program. President Trump has called for a trillion dollar investment. Some Republicans in Congress resist on the grounds that the idea is more big spending, with no clear way to pay for it. And many Democrats are skeptical of the Trump specifics, in particular the emphasis on tax breaks for private investors who build profit-making infrastructure like toll-roads and bridges; they demand that the investment be focused on public goods across the board ranging from repairing roads and bridges, to mass transit. How can these circles be squared? Or should Trump simply ignore the Democrats, find a way to consolidate Republicans (what is it?), and push his vision through? Take account of the pressure on members of Congress to give a President of their own party leeway in the first year. Can GOP members afford to break with Trump—or is there a greater risk of offending their own Tea Party-like base? What about the alternative of an infrastructure bank, first advanced by former Senators John Kerry and Kay Bailey Hutchinson; could it provide a basis for compromise? Since the Trump tax cut, combined with infrastructure spending, would have a simulative impact on the economy, calculate the likely political consequences. (All this would also add to the deficit. How much does that matter in policy terms—and does the capital administration have to worry about its potential political costs?)

2. Analyze how Governor Andrew Cuomo has achieved his public policy successes. Why did he prevail on so many big issues while his predecessor as a self-proclaimed reformer, Eliot Spitzer, fell short? Examine the impact of his victories on the budget, marriage equality, and gun legislation on different constituencies and his potential run for a third term in 2018. His tacit alliance with State Senate Republicans alienated a portion of Democratic base, and reduced his margin of victory in the last election. Why was he so intent on continuing that alliance? He short-circuited an investigation into public corruption and that arguably enabled the passage of much of his agenda. What should and can he do now on the corruption issue? How can he advance, his national political ambitions so he can run against President Trump in 2020?

3. Write a memo to President Trump recommending how to deal with the moribund Middle-East peace process. He said he wants his son in law, Jared Kushner, to play a role, perhaps a lead role, in the endeavor. Is that a good idea? Should he hold to the position of past presidents, which envisioned agreed upon land swaps as the basis for a two state solution? How can his Administration deal with settlement expansion, the status of Jerusalem, and the calls from some in Israel to abandon the two state idea? Take account of domestic political pressures, how they limit Trump’s freedom of action, and how he can respond to pull off the art of this deal.

4. During the campaign, President Trump pledged to destroy ISIS, whatever it takes. Write a memo assessing the effectiveness of what he has done so far: should his approach be continued, ramped up, or modified? How has his policy changed the way we deal with the Russians in Syria? Explore the political impact of all this on domestic public opinion. Does he have to “win” reasonably soon—and what does that mean? How can he handle the fallout of an ISIS inspired terrorist attack in the United States?
5. Write a memo to Democratic Senate Leader Chuck Schumer and House Leader Nancy Pelosi recommending a strategy to respond to the Trump Administration restrictions on refugees and immigrants from Muslim nations. How can the strategy be made politically viable, both among Democratic voters, who tend to oppose overbroad restrictions, and the more general public which may favor them?

6. Write a memo to Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti on the verge of his second term. If his re-election is suddenly in doubt, what policies can he weaponize politically to secure it? More likely, if his re-election is safe, what policies can and should he pursue to advance his future statewide prospects? Does Measure M, the mass transit initiative passed last November, offer him a chance to claim a major achievement—and how important would that be to voters in a statewide context? How can he distinguish himself from rivals like former Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, if Garsetti runs for Governor or Lt. Governor Gavin Newsom if Dianne Feinstein retires and they both run for the Senate? Is there a way forward for him nationally if he runs for neither position? And which of his policies as Mayor can be deployed to advance his prospects? Does his ethnicity matter at a statewide and potentially national level—and how does that influence his decision-making on Trump’s policies toward “sanctuary cities.” (Los Angeles is one.) What are the dangers that confront him as Mayor—and can he prepare for or preempt them?

7. Propose a ballot initiative for 2018 in California that will enhance either Democratic or Republican priorities in this very blue state. Outline the message(s) that could build support for the initiative—and the response to likely attacks. And who will pay for the campaign?

8. Advise Democratic Leaders on future proposals for gun safety legislation. Nothing of substance is likely to pass in this Congress with President Trump rolling back Obama executive orders on guns. Should Democrats push legislation anyway—and what should it call for? Will this help or hurt Democratic prospects in 2018? In any event, would the Democratic base, especially in primaries, allow potential nominees to ignore the issue? Is the best alternative action at the state and local level, such as California’s restriction on large ammunition clips? How effective is that—as policy—or as politics?